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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE OBJECT OF THE ANALYSIS

In the past thirty years, the original centralized model of judicial
review, adopted in almost all European countries, has progressively
developed into a more "subjective" form of constitutional control,' as a
1. In classifying different systems ofjudicial review, Spanish constitutional scholar
Francisco Rubio Llorente developed a juxtaposition between "objective" and
"subjective" systems based on the systems' main center of interest. "Objective" systems
of judicial review focus on the defense of the authority of the law, which can be
preserved only if the statutory laws enacted in the system are consistent with the
Constitution; this consistency is seen as a value in itself, beneficial to the "purity" of the
constitutional system as a whole. Conversely, "subjective" models of judicial review
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result of the expansive force of fundamental rights in modern societies
and the adoption of comprehensive charters of rights in central and
eastern European countries. 2 Constitutional courts have come to play a
central role in the protection of first-, second- and third-generation rights
in both consolidated and newly established democracies.
With the assistance of the Council of Europe, several central and
eastern European countries that achieved independence after the fall of
communist rule have revised their old constitutions or adopted new
fundamental charters to include systems of direct access to constitutional
and supreme courts (also called systems of 'individual constitutional
focus on the protection of fundamental rights. The aspects are, of course, interrelated: the
exercise of a more "objective" type of control also furthers-indirectly-protection of
fundamental rights, every time that it expels from the system a law that unconstitutionally
limits the exercise of fundamental rights. At the same time, a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute limiting fundamental rights contributes to the general
"objective" "purity" of the system, diminishing the number of unconstitutional laws
existing in the system. The difference between the two models lies, therefore, in the main
goal they aim to achieve. See Rubio Llorente F., Seis tesis sobre la jurisdicci6n
constitucional en Europa [Six theses on the constitutionaljurisdiction in Europe], 12
REVISTA
ESPANOLA
DE
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
9 (1992) available at
http://www.cepc.es/es/Publicaciones/revistas/revistas.aspx?IDR=6&1DN=337&IDA=250
68; Tendances actuelles de lajuridictionconstitutionnelle en Europe [Currenttrends of
the constitutionaljurisdiction in Europe], in ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE
CONSTITUTIONNELLE 9 (1996).
For a thorough analysis of the differences between
"centralized" and "decentralized" systems ofjudicial review, vesting functions ofjudicial
review, respectively, in one single specialized court or, conversely, in all ordinary judges,
see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 45 (BobbsMerrill Co., Inc. 1971); Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Columbia University Press
1990); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 464
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1999); NORMAN DORSEN, MICHAEL ROSENFEL, ANDRAS SAJ6 &
SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 113 (West

Publishing Company 2003).
2. One indicator of this development is the entry into force, in March 2010, of 2008
CONST. 724 (Fr.) (amending the 1958 French Constitution to introduce for the first time
in France an a posteriori, concrete system of judicial review). For an account of the
reform, see MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(Carolina Academic Press 2010).
3. The Council of Europe ("CoE") is a regional human-rights organization
established by the Treaty of London on May 5, 1949. The CoE seeks to develop
throughout Europe common democratic principles based on the European Convention on
Human Rights ("ECHR"), an international human-rights treaty signed in Rome on
November 4, 1950.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
221, available at
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dcl3-4318-b4575c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The CoE has now fortyseven Member States with a total population of about 800 million people. Respect of the
ECHR is guaranteed by a supranational judicial body, the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR"), whose interpretation of the ECHR and decisions are binding on
Member States.
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complaint,' hereinafter "ICC"). 4 These systems grant natural and legal
persons direct access to a constitutional or supreme court to claim
infringement of fundamental constitutional rights and to request a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the challenged act(s) or action(s)
violating their rights (whether with erga omnes or interpartes effects).'
The Italian Constitution, a product of the constitution-making wave
that took place after the Second World War,6 does not envisage the
possibility that an action seeking constitutional review may be lodged by
a citizen or a group of citizens directly with the Constitutional Court. In
the mixed centralized-decentralized system of judicial review adopted in
Italy, an issue of the constitutionality of legislation-besides those cases
in which a direct action can be filed by constitutionally designated State
bodies-can be raised only in the course of ordinary judicial proceedings
in which the challenged law should be applied, either upon petition of
one of the private parties or of the public prosecutor, or on its own
initiative by the court. However, as protection of fundamental rights
becomes a defining and predominant feature of modem
constitutionalism, the debate over the introduction of the possibility for
an individual to directly apply to the Constitutional Court, claiming
infringement of a constitutionally entrenched right by unconstitutional
actions of a public power, has been increasingly recurrent in Italy. Yet it
is a debate that dates back to the very foundation of the Italian Republic
and the adoption of the 1948 Constitution.
Systems of direct access to constitutional and supreme courts are
generally considered positively, as they can supplement the existing
avenues for access to constitutional or supreme courts and provide
protection of fundamental rights in so-called "grey areas" not covered by
these types of remedies. Moreover, from a supranational perspective, the
European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of
Europe' considers positively the adoption of such systems-provided
4. For present purposes, the expressions "individual constitutional complaint"
("ICC") and "direct recourse" to a supreme or constitutional court will be considered
synonymous.
5. Conversely, in systems of indirect individual access, the constitutionality of an
act or action can be challenged only through the action of state bodies.
6. See Elster J., Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-MakingProcess, 45
DUKE L.J. 364, 368-373 (1995) (identifying seven waves of constitution-making). With
specific regard to judicial review, Louis Favoreau speaks of four waves of constitutional
justice: see Louis FAVOREAU, LES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES [CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS] 1-2,4 (Presses Universitaires de France 3d ed. 1996).
7. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as "Venice
Commission") is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. It was
established in 1990 and over the years has played a leading role in the adoption of
constitutions that conform to the standards of Europe's constitutional heritage. In 2002,
it was authorized to accept non-European observer members and currently has fifty-seven
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they do not overburden the domestic court vested with power of judicial
review-as they represent an effective filter for cases of alleged
violations of fundamental rights before they reach the European Court of
Human Rights. 8
However, if not properly designed, these systems are likely to result
in the overburdening of a constitutional or supreme court due to the high
number of applications lodged. 9 The balance between an effective
protection of human rights and an efficient and timely exercise of the
High Court's functions has been struck differently in different
several States have declined to adopt a system of
jurisdictions:
individual constitutional complaint altogether, while others have
established strict accessibility requirements making direct recourse a
merely subsidiary mechanism for the protection of constitutional rights
and requiring, for example, the previous exhaustion of all other legal
remedies or the special "constitutional significance" of the question of
constitutionality to be lodged.
Part I of this article will provide a comparative overview of the
origins, structure and functioning of the systems of direct access to
constitutional and supreme courts adopted worldwide, addressing Latin
American, European, Asian and African jurisdictions, focusing on the
structure of the individual constitutional complaint and on admissibility
requirements.
With regard to this latter aspect, the present analysis will comprise
all systems of individual constitutional complaint irrespective of
requirements (if any) established for standing to file the claim. The
analysis will therefore include both systems which have adopted the socalled "actio popularis" (where every person is entitled to challenge an
act of the public powers after its enactment, without the need to prove
Member States and eleven more Associate, Observer (including the United States) and
Special-Status
States.
See
Venice
Commission, Council
of Europe,
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/ main/PresentationE.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
8. The Commission underlines that:
the European Court of Human Rights' statistics show that those countries in
which such a full constitutional complaint mechanism exists have a lower
number of complaints (in proportion to the number of their population)
before the Court than others, which do not have such a mechanism. Such
complaint mechanisms therefore help to avoid overburdening the European
Court of Human Rights.
Venice Commission Study no. 538/2009, adopted by the Commission during its 85th
Plenary session held in Venice, Italy on 17-18 December 2010 at 4, available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)039rev-e.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2011). For the final version of the "Study on Individual Access to Constitutional
Justice," see 86th Plenary Session of the Commission (Venice), Calendar of Events,
Venice Commission, Council of Europe, http://www.venice.coe.int (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
9. As it happened, for example, in Croatia and Spain.
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e.g., Croatia and
that he or she is affected by the provision:
Liechtenstein) and systems where evidence of (probable) harm is
required. Also, the analysis will be conducted on several systems of
individual constitutional complaint, irrespective of the choice made in
the single legal system with regard to the possible object of the
challenge: actions and omissions of public powers, statutory laws and
regulations.
Part II will then address possible benefits (if any) of the introduction
of such a system in Italy. After presenting the main features of the
Italian system of judicial review, the article will describe proposals that,
since 1947, have been presented to introduce a system of direct access to
the Italian Constitutional Court in order to supplement the already
existing avenues of access to the Court.
Part III will then offer some reflections on the actual advantages (if
any) that adoption of such a system would bring to the Italian legal
system, compared to the already existing incidenter control of
constitutionality ("controllo di costituzionalitain via incidentale").
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A.

Latin America

The first modem system of direct access to courts for the protection
of fundamental rights from unconstitutional acts or actions is identified
in the so-called "juicio de amparo" or "writ of amparo," a
distinguishable feature of the Latin American constitutional tradition. 10
The writ, action, recourse or suit of amparo is defined as an extraordinary
judicial proceeding established for the protection of constitutional rights
and freedoms from infringement by the State or even-in some casesby private individuals, which normally concludes with a judicial order or
writ of protection."
In Latin American countries, the amparo

10. The word "amparo" means "protection" in Spanish. For an account of the
philosophical origins and historical antecedents of the writ of amparo, see IGNACIO
BURGOA, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO [THE AMPARO PROCEDURE] (Porrda 18th ed. 2001); Jost
Luis SOBERANES FERNANDEZ & FAUSTINO JosE MARTINEZ MARTINEZ, APUNTES PARA LA
HISTORIA DEL JuIcio DE AMPARO [NOTES FOR A HISTORY OF THE AMPARO PROCEDURE]
(Porrnia, 2002).
11. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS I
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); EL DERECHO DE AMPARO EN EL MUNDO [THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AROUND THE WORLD] (Hector Fix-Zamudio & Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor eds.,

Porrfia 2006).
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supplements the existing ordinary types of remedy available in the codes
of procedure. 12
From a theoretical and philosophical standpoint, the writ's origin is
associated with the inclusion in Latin American constitutions of
extensive declarations of civil, political, social, cultural, economic,
environmental and indigenous rights, together with their frequent
violation by public powers.' 3 Historically, the writ of amparo was first
included in the Constitution for the State of Yucatan of 184114 and
subsequently adopted in the 1857 Constitution of Mexico." The system
then spread throughout Latin America and was included-in a variety of
forms and structures-in the constitutions drafted in former Spanish
colonies and in Spanish-speaking countries, to be finally incorporated
also into the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.1 6
It is worth noting, though, that in Latin America, the amparo
procedure is only one of the procedures adopted for the protection of
12. This means that protection of fundamental rights can be achieved in two ways:
first, by means of the general established suits prescribed in the codes of civil and
criminal procedures; secondly, and in addition to the abovementioned means, through
specific and separate judicial proceedings specifically established for the protection of
some or all of the rights entrenched in the constitution.
13. The Latin American tradition of adopting declarations of rights dates back as far
as 1811, with the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the People by the Supreme
Congress of Venezuela.
See
14. Constitucidn Politica del Estado de Yucatdn of March 31, 1841.
FERNANDEZ & MARTiNEZ, supra note 10, at 220.
15. However, the writ of amparo was present in Mexico since 1847, when it was
introduced under art. 25 of the 1847 Acts of Constitutional Reform as the duty of federal
courts to provide protection to citizens against State actions. Mexican constitutional
scholars acknowledge the influence of the United States system of judicial reviewknown through Alexis de Toqueville's "Democracy in America"-in the development of
the writ of amparo. For a thorough account of the different typologies of the recourse of
amparo in Mexico-where it has developed in its most complex and articulated formsee HECTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO & EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, EL DERECHO DE AMPARO
EN MXICO (Poria 2006). For present purposes, the type of amparo relevant to our
analysis is the so-called "amparo contra leyes," a judicial recourse directed to challenge
self-executing statutes that violate the constitution.
16. Article 25, clause I ("Right to Judicial Protection") of the American Convention
on Human Rights (Pactode San Jose) provides:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that
violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the
state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has defined this article of the Convention as a "general provision that gives
expression to the procedural institution known as amparo, which is a simple and prompt
remedy designated for the protection of all of the rights recognized in the constitution and
laws of the member States and by the Convention," see Advisory Opinion OC-8/87,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, 32 (Jan. 30, 1987).
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fundamental rights, which procedures allow direct access to a judicial
body. From a purely theoretical standpoint, fundamental rights can
indeed be guaranteed with up to three different avenues of direct judicial
recourse: the amparo proceeding, the habeas corpus appeal and the
habeas data claim.
All these proceedings allow an individual to apply directly to a
judicial body (not just the supreme or constitutional court) and activate a
fast-track judicial recourse for the protection of various fundamental
rights. With few exceptions, the habeas corpus appeal is usually directed
to protect personal freedom and integrity; the habeas data is directed
towards protection of rights involved in the handling and storing of
personal information in databanks or registries; the amparo proceeding is
directed towards protection of the remaining fundamental rights (the
majority) entrenched in the constitution.17
Today, the writ of amparo is included and regulated in Latin
American constitutions and in those statutes enacted to implement the
constitutional provisions and provide procedural guidelines on how to
activate the recourse. Habeas corpus and habeas data procedures also
find their discipline in constitutions and/or statutes.18
Interestingly, the amparo recourse and the habeas corpus and habeas
data guarantees (when available) have been adopted in Latin America
both in countries with a centralized system of judicial review (Bolivia,' 9
Chile,20 Costa Rica, 2 1 El Salvador,22 Honduras,23 Panama, 24 Paraguay, 25

17. Only a minority of Latin American countries have adopted all three types of
recourses. In the majority of them only one or two of these recourses have been
established. In these cases, the recourse(s) available can be activated also for protection
of the rights usually associated with a different type of recourse. For example,
Guatemala and Mexico have adopted only the amparo procedure, and therefore the
amparo is designed to protect all constitutional rights and freedoms, including personal
liberty and personal data. Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua
and Uruguay have adopted both the amparo and habeas corpus proceedings; Venezuela
has adopted the amparo and the habeas data procedures; finally, Argentina, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru have adopted all
three types of recourses: amparo, habeas corpus and habeas data. While the amparo is
conceived to protect all fundamental rights entrenched in a country's constitution, some
constitutions have limited the number of rights that can be protected through the amparo
procedure, as in the case of Colombia, Chile and Mexico. One of the most often
excluded rights from the amparo recourse is the right to property.
18. Details on constitutional provisions and implementing statutes are provided, for
each country, in the following footnotes.
19. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA (1967), arts. 18, 19, 58 and 120, cl.
7; Law No. 1836, Apr. 1, 1998, GACETA BOLIVIA, (on the Constitutional Tribunal)

(amparo and habeas corpus).
20. CoNsTITUCIoN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 19-21 (1967);
Law No. 1552, Sept. 13, 1976, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile) (amparo and habeas
corpus).
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and Uruguay 26) and in countries with either a decentralized (Argentina 2 7 )
or mixed (Brazil,2 8 Colombia,29 the Dominican Republic, 3 0 Ecuador,31
Guatemala, 3 2 MeXiCO, 3 3 Nicaragua, 34 Peru3 and Venezuela 36 ) system of
21. CONSTITUcION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 48 (1949); Law
no. 7135, Oct. 19, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Costa Rica) (amparo and habeas
corpus).
22. CONSTITUCION, Dec. 20, 1983 art. 24, 247 (El. Salvador); see also Ley de
Procedimientos Constitucionales, Decreto Legislativo N. 2996 (El Salvador), Jan. 14
1960, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c6a91452.html (amparo and
habeas corpus) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
23. CoNsTITUCIoN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982, Jan. 20, 1989,
arts. 182 (habeas corpus and habeas data), 183 (amparo), 316; see also Lei sobre Justicia
Constitucional(2004).
24. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA, Oct. 11, 1972, art. 54; see
also CODIGO JUDICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA, arts. 2615-2632 (Book IV,
Instituciones de Garantia) (amparo); CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE
PANAMA, Oct. 11, 1972, art. 23; see also CODIGO JUDICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
arts. 2615-2632 (Book IV, Instituciones de Garantia)(habeas corpus); CONSTITUTION OF
PANAMA, Oct. 11, 1972, art. 44 (habeas data).
25. CONSTITUCIoN POLITICA DE 1992 June 20, 1992, arts. 133 (habeas corpus), 134
(amparo), 135 (habeas data) (Para.); see also CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL, No. 1337, 1988,
arts. 565-588 (Para.).
26. See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY DE 1967,
arts. 7(72), 332, see also Law No. 16011 (amparo) (Urg), Dec. 1, 1988; CONSTITUC6N
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY DE 1967, arts. 17; see also Law No.
16011 (habeas corpus) (Urg.), Dec. 1, 1988 (by judicial interpretaton).
27. Art. 43, CONSTITUC16N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.), see also Accidn de
Amparo (amparo) Law No. 16986, 1966 (Arg.); see also Habeas Corpus Statute Law No.
23098, 1984 (Arg.); see also Personal Data Protection Statute Law No. 25366, 2000
(Arg.).
28. CONSTITUICAo FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.), see also Mandado
de Securanga Decreto No. 1533, de 31 de Dezembro de 1951, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 31 de Dezembro de 1951 (Braz.); see also Mandado de Securanga Decreto
No. 4.348, de 26 de Junho de 1964, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 27 de Junho
de 1964 (Braz.) (amparo, habeas corpus, habeas data).
29. CONSTITUCl6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P] [CONSTITUTION] art. 86 (1991); see
L. 2591, Noviembre 19, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (Accion de Tutela
(amparo)); L. 306, 1992 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (Accidn de Tutela (amparo)); L.
382, 2000 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (Accidn de Tutela (amparo)); CONSTITUCIN
POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 30; see also L. 1095, 11 de Febrero,
2006 (DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (habeas corpus).
30. CONSTITUC16N DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA Jan. 26, 2010, art. 72; see also L.
437 (2006) (Dom. Rep.) (on the establishment of the Amparo recourse (amparo));
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA, art. 71; see also CODE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. PROC.], Law no. 76, arts. 381-392 (2002) (Dom. Rep.) (habeas
corpus); CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA Jan. 26, 2010, art. 70 (habeas
data).
31. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 88 (amparo),
89, 90 (habeas corpus), 92 (habeas data); see also Ley de ControlConstitucionalLaw No.
000 RO/99, July 2,1997 (Ecuador).
32. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA May 30, 1985, art. 265
(amparo); see also Ley de Amparo, Exhibici6n Personal y Constitucionalidad (Law of
Protection, Personal Exhibition and Constitutionality) Decreto No. 1/86 (1998).
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control of constitutionality:37 a clear sign of the versatility of these
institutions and their compatibility with both systems of constitutional
jurisdiction.
While the amparo system of judicial review can be considered the
historical antecedent and the main source of inspiration for European
systems of individual constitutional complaint, a significant difference
exists between the Latin American and the European version of direct
access to courts: through the Latin American amparo, habeas corpus and
habeas data, a complaint can be lodged-with few exceptionS3 8-with all
courts in the legal system and not just with a country's supreme or
constitutional court, irrespective of the fact that the country has adopted a
centralized, decentralized or mixed system of judicial review. 39
In light of this difference, only the systems of amparo adopted in
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua-granting direct access only to
the country's constitutional and supreme court-can properly be
compared to those established in Europe and to a system of individual
constitutional complaint.
Despite this significant difference, however, it is worth emphasizing
some general features of the Latin American amparo procedure. In Latin
a) not only against
America, the amparo can be activated:

33. CONSTITUCioN POLiTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.], Arts.
103,107, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.] 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); see also,
Ley de Amparo [L.A.] [Legal Protection Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.] 17 de Junio de 2009 (amparo and habeas corpus). In Mexico and
Venezuela, the recourse of amparo is designed as a constitutional right enforceable

through a variety of recourses, which includes also the recourse for habeas corpus. These
recourses are: amparo de la libertad (corresponding to a writ of habeas corpus), amparo

judicial (also called amparo de casaci6n), amparo administrative, amparo agrario,
amparo contra leyes (the amparo against unconstitutional legislative enactments).
34. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] arts. 188
(amparo), 189 (habeas corpus), 190, LA GACETA, DIARIo OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 de Enero de
1987; see also, Ley de Amparo, LA GACETA art. 49 (11 de Febrero de 2008) (Nicar).
35. CONSTITUC16N POLITICA DEL PERO Jun. 12, 1995, arts. 200, 202; see also CODIGO
PEROCESAL CONSTITUTIONAL, [EL PERUANO] no. 28237 (11 de mayo de 2004) (Peru). (the

Constitutional Procedural Code) (amparo, habeas corpus and habeas data).
36. See CONSTITUC16N DE LA REPJBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, Gaceta
Oficial de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela Diciembre 1999, art. 27; see also
Organic Law on the Constitutional Rights and Guarantees of 1988, GACETA OFICIAL DE
LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 33891 (22 de Enero de 1988)

(Venezuela) (amparo and habeas data).
37. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS INLATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS (2009) (for
the classification and information on constitutional and statutory provisions).
38. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua.
See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION, supranote 37, at 140.
39. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 37, at 77.
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unconstitutional actions but also against omissions,40 and b) not only
against actions or omissions of the State but also for unconstitutional
actions or omissions of other individuals. 4 1 Moreover, c) the
constitutional rights protected are not just first- and second-generation
rights (civil and political) but also third-generation ones (social,
environmental, consumers' and aboriginal rights); d) the amparo
requires, generally, the previous exhaustion of all other available legal
remedies; 42 e) in some cases, the amparo can be used also to prevent a
violation, when there is reason to believe that a right is in peril of being

40. See, e.g., Argentina, Art. 43, CONSTITUci6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.);
Costa Rica, see CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art. 48 (1949);
El Salvador CONSTITUCION, Dec. 20, 1983 art. 24, 247 (El. Salvador); Bolivia, see
CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA (1967), art. 129 (2009); Honduras see
CONsTITucloN POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS DE 1982 (Jan. 20, 1989), art,
183; Paraguay see CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY (20 de Junio
de 1992), art. 134; Uruguay see Accion de Amapro, [Amparo Law] no. 16.011 (19 de
Diciembre de 1988); Brazil see ALLAN R.. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION, supra note 37, at 142; Dominican Republic, see Recurso de Amparo
[Amparo Law] no. 437-06 (30 de Novembre de 2006) (Dom. Rep.); Ecudador, see
CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DEL ECUADOR, (1998) art. 95.

41.

See, e.g., Argentina, see Art. 43, CONSTITUCION NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.];

Bolivia, see CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL BOLIVIA, 2009, art. 129;
Domincan Republic, see CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA, 26 de
Enero de 2010, art. 72; Guatemala, see CONSTITUCi6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL
GUATEMALA, 17 de Noviembre de 1993, art. 265; Nicaragua, see CONSTITUClIN POLITICA
DE LA REPOLICA DC NICARAGUA [CN.] arts. 188 (amparo); Paraguay, see CONSTITUCI6N

POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PARAGUAY, 20 de Junio de 1992, art. 134; Peru, see
CONSTITUClON POLITICA DEL PERO, as amended, 12 de Junio de 1995, art. 200; Uruguay,

see Accion de Amapro, [Amparo Law] no. 16.011 (19 de Diciembre de 1988); Venezula,
see CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELa, Diciembre 1999, Art.

27. In Colombia and Ecuador only against individuals exercising "public service," see
CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], 20 de Julio de 1991, art. 86; see also
CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE ECUADOR, 2008 art. 88, while in Costa

Rica, Honduras and Ecuador amparo is limited to those subjects exercising "public
powers."
42. See, e.g., Argentina, see art. 43, CONSTITUClON NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.);
Bolivia, see CONSTITUCI5N POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL BOLIVIA, 2009, art. 129;

Uruguay, see Accion de Amparo, [Amparo Law] no. 16.011 (19 de Diciembre de 1988);
Colombia, see CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 86; Peru, see
CONSTITUClON POLiTICA DEL PERO, as amended, 12 de Junio de 1995, art. 200.
Venezuela, however, represents an exception to this rule. See CONSTITUCION DE LA
REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, Diciembre 1999, art. 27.
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violated; 4 3 f) finally, a few countries limit the acts that can be challenged
through the amparo procedure."
B.

Europe

In Europe, several countries have adopted a system of individual
constitutional complaint, in a variety of structures and forms. A more
detailed analysis of a few of these jurisdictions and of the specific
systems of individual constitutional complaint adopted therein will help
determine whether Italy too should incorporate such a system to enhance
protection of fundamental rights. Austria and Germany have been
chosen since their constitutions belong-as the Italian one-to the wave
of constitution-making which took place after the Second World War and
to the same civilian legal tradition; Spain has been chosen to illustrate the
possible shortcomings of the adoption of a highly open system of
individual constitutional complaint; Switzerland as a country
characterized by a tradition of direct popular participation and direct
access to institutional bodies; finally, Belgium has been chosen to show
how even a relatively old constitution (1831) can be modified to include
a system of individual constitutional complaint.
1.

Austria

Austria has both historical and contemporary significance for any
comparative study of systems of judicial review: on one hand, it
represents one of the two European countries to first adopt a system of
judicial review in its archetypal centralized (Kelsenian) form; 45 on the
43. See, e.g., Colombia, see CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 86;
Dominican Republic, see CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA, 26 de Enero
2010, art. 72; Guatemala, see CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DEL
GUATEMALA, 17 de Noviembre de 1993, art. 265; Nicaragua, see CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA
DE LA REPJBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. X, ch, 1, art. 188, LA GACETA DIARIo OFICIAL
[L.G.] 1987 ("in peril to be violated"); Paraguay. see CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE LA
20 de Junio de 1992, art. 134 ("imminent danger").
44. See, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, where statutory laws cannot be
challenged through the amparo procedure. See Art. 43, CONSTITUCl6N NACIONAL
[CONsT. NAC.] [Arg.]; see also CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE PARAGUAY,
20 de Junio de 1992, art. 134; see also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERO, as amended,
art. 200, 12 de Junio de 1995. Conversely, in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, judicial decisions are excluded from the possibility of being
challenged. See 43, CONSTITUCi6N NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [Arg.], CONSTITUClON
REPOBLICA DE PARAGUAY,

POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.], art. 86; see also CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA
DE ECUADOR, 2008, art. 88; see also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE

PARAGUAY, 20 de Junio de 1992, art. 134; see also CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERO, as

amended, 12 de Junio de 1995 art. 200.
45. The first European centralized systems of judicial review were established in
Czechoslovakia and Austria by, respectively, the Constitution of Czechoslovakia of
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other, and more relevantly to this study, Austria represents the
jurisdiction that first adopted-among the German-speaking areas of
Europe-a system of individual constitutional complaint. 46
The current Constitution of the Republic of Austria
(Bundesverfassungsgesetz) was adopted in 1920.47 After undergoing
revision in 1929, it was suspended in 1933 until the end of the Second
World War and then reinstated in 1945.48
In addition to the extant incidenter procedure for the assessment of
the constitutionality of legal acts set forth in articles 89 and 129 of the
Constitution, the current text of the Austrian Constitution provides two
possible avenues for individuals to directly access the Constitutional
Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) in order to challenge legal acts allegedly
violating their fundamental rights.
The first avenue (so-called Bescheidbeschwerde) is described at
article 144 of the Constitution, which allows direct individual complaints
against an administrative decision violating a person's rights through the
application of an illegal general norm. As a precondition to the
admissibility of the challenge, the applicant is requested to have
previously exhausted all remedies made available by administrative law,
so that, in practice, only the ruling of the last (supreme) administrative

February 29, 1920, and by the Constitution of Austria of October 1, 1920. The systems
were based on the ideas of the Prague-born jurist Hans Kelsen and are universally
recognized as the prototypes of the centralized systems of judicial review, and as a
counter model to the United States system of judicial review. Some authors note,
however, that a form of centralized constitutional review already existed in 1858 in
Venezuela, although it did not develop into a prototype: see Justin 0. Frosini,
Constitutional Courts in Latin America: A Testing Ground for New Parameters of
Classification, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY. JCL STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE LAW No. 1, 348 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
46. STAATSGRUNDGESETZ OBER DIE ALLGEMEINEN RECHTE DER STAATSBORGER
[STGG] [FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS] RGBI No. 1867/143 (Austria). The individual
constitutional complaint was first introduced in Austria by the Fundamental Law of the
State (Staatsgrundgesetz) which created a new "Court of the Reich" (Oberstes
Reichsgericht), a forerunner of the current Constitutional Court. One of the functions of
the Court was to judge complaints filed by citizens alleging a violation of the political
rights-especially fundamental rights and the right to vote-protected in the
Fundamental Law of the State on the Rights of the Citizens against administrative acts
(legislative acts were excluded from scrutiny); see STAATSGRUNDGESETZ OBER DIE
ALLGEMEINEN RECHTE DER STAATSBORGER [STGG] [FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS] RGBI No.
1867/142, as last amended by Bundesgesetz [BG] BGB I No. 100/2003, art. 142
(Austria).
47. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ DER REPUBLIK OSTERREICH [B-VG] [Constitution]
BGBI No. 1/1920 (Austria). Between 1934 and 1945, Austria was ruled under the 1934
authoritarian Constitution. The activity of the Austrian Constitutional Court was
interrupted in May 1933 to resume only in 1946.
48. Id.
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instance may be a subject of the Court's review.4 9 Moreover, a challenge
to the last administrative ruling can be filed only within six weeks of its
delivery.
The second avenue was created by a 1975 amendment that
introduced a further type of individual constitutional complaint (called
Individualantragor Individualbeschwerde).50 With regard to this second
avenue, articles 139 and 140 of the Constitution indicate that the
Constitutional Court pronounces on the unconstitutionality of statutes
and on the illegality of regulations when the application alleges direct
infringement of personal rights through such unconstitutionality or
illegality in so far as the law or the regulation has become operative for
the applicant without the delivery of a judicial decision or the issue of a
ruling.51 Admissibility requirements are therefore quite demanding: in
order for the complaint to be admissible, the applicant (either a natural or
a legal person) must show that no chance of obtaining another legal
remedy is available and that neither a judgment nor an administrative
ruling has been delivered in the case. Moreover, the alleged harm to the
applicant's rights must be personal, direct and actual.
Both types of individual constitutional complaints clearly have a
subsidiary character and are designed only to supplement the other
avenues available to an individual to challenge the constitutionality of
normative enactments (mainly the incidenter proceedings).
2.

Germany

Together with the incidenter review of legislation, disciplined at
article 100, the 1949 German Constitution (Grundgesetz) today also
disciplines at article 93(4a) a system of individual constitutional
complaint (direct individual recourse or Verfassungsbeschwerde). The
possibility for an individual to directly access the Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht)for the protection of fundamental rights, in
Germany, is consistent with the general spirit of the German
Constitution, which-adopted in the aftermath of the Second World
War-strongly reaffirmed the central role of human dignity and

49. See Anna Gamper, The ConstitutionalCourt of Austria: Modern Profiles of an
Archetype of Constitutional Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS. A COMPARATIVE
STUDY. JCL STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LAw No. 1, 44 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland
eds., 2009).
50. BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [BVG] [Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
as amended in 1929, provisions for the extension of the States of the Board
Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] No.
302/1975 (Austria).
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ DER REPUBLIK OSTERREICH, supra note 47, at art.
51.
139 and art. 140 (Austria).
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fundamental rights in order to prevent the reoccurrence of the tragic
violations of human rights the country had experienced during the war. 5 2
The original text of the Constitution did not establish a system of
individual constitutional complaint. This system was first introduced in
1951 with the enactment of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court,
which also marked the beginning of the activities of that Court. 53 The
system was then entrenched in the Constitution with a constitutional
amendment in 1969.54 The recourse can be lodged-without cost and
with few formal requirements-by every person (both citizens and
foreign nationals, legal and natural persons) against an action or
omission of the public powers violating civil and political rights
entrenched in the Constitution.55
Since its establishment, the direct individual recourse has become
the most often used avenue to access the Court, which, over the years,
has developed in its jurisprudence some admissibility criteria in order to
limit use of the individual-constitutional-complaint system and avoid the
overburdening of the Court.56 These conditions are: a) the previous
52. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Federal Constitution]
[GG] art. I (F.R.G.). This commitment to protection of human dignity and fundamental
rights is celebrated in article I of the German Constitution, which famously states that:
"Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state
authority. . . . The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable
human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. The
following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly
applicable law."
53. BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS-GESETZ [Federal Constitional Court Act], March

12, 1951, BGBI. I at 243 (F.R.G.).
54. Article 93(4a) of the German Constitution now states that the Federal
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction over constitutional complaints filed by any person
alleging that one of his or her basic rights has been infringed by an act or action or
omission of the public authority (including judicial decisions). See GRUNDGESETZ FOR
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Federal Constitution] [GG] art. 93(4) (F.R.G.). A
complaint can be lodged against the unconstitutional violation of articles 1-19, 20(2), 33,
38, 101, 102, 103 and 104 of the Constitution. See, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ [Federal Constitional Court Act] arts. 13, 90 & 95, as last amended July 16,
1998, BGBI. I at 1473 (F.R.G). Over the years, the Constitutional Court has adopted a
generous interpretation of the right to a "free development of [one's own] personality" of
article 2, cl. I Cont. and has therefore broadened the protection offered and the possibility
to lodge a recourse.
55.

See BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS-GESETZ [Federal Constitional Court Act] art.

93, as last amended July 16, 1998, BGBI. I at 1473 (F.R.G). See also. Donald P.
Kommers, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the
German Federal Constitutional Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS. A COMPARATIVE
STUDY. JCL STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LAW No. 1, 113 (Andrew Harding & Peter
Leyland eds., 2009).
56. In 2006, for the first time, the applications lodged with the Constitutional Court
within the year were more than 6,000. In the average, the Court receives around 5,000
applications each year: 98% of them are individual constitutional complaints.
Notwithstanding these high figures, 70% of the direct individual recourses are taken care
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exhaustion of all available legal remedies; 57 b) the existence of a
personal, direct, and current interest in the recourse;58 c) filing within a
statute of limitation: the recourse can be lodged with the Court only
within one month from the date the administrative act or the judicial
decision has been issued, or one year from the entry into force of the
challenged statute; 9 d) the possibility to challenge only self-executing
statutes. 6 0 The screening of the petitions is entrusted to special threejudge panels of the Court, the so-called "Kammer" (chambers) during a
prehearing stage, and the decision is not appealable. 6' The Court also
has the power to issue fines to those who lodge applications lacking the
very basic elements for their admissibility. 62 In addition to these
conditions, the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court states that a
constitutional complaint will be admitted to consideration only if it has
"fundamental constitutional significance" (i.e. the issue has not already
been addressed by the Court), and the complainant may suffer
"especially grave disadvantage as a result of refusal to decide on the
complaint."6 3
As of today, the Court reviews in full about one percent of all the
individual constitutional complaints lodged, but according to some
commentators, "such complaints result in some of its most significant
decisions and make up more than fifty percent of its published
opinions."64

of within a year. The percentage of successful recourses is low, around 2.5%. See
Francesco Palermo, La Giustizia Costituzionale in Germania [ConstitutionalJustice in
Germany], in SISTEMI E MODELLI DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE [SYSTEMS AND MODELS OF
Figures are available, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] 152 (Luca Mezzetti ed., 2009).
English, on the website of the German Constitutional Court: http://www.bverfg.de (last
visited, Apr. 1, 2011).
57. Art. 93 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Klaus Schlaich, Procddures and techniques de protection des droit
fondamentaux. Tribunal Constitutionnel Fedcral allemand [Proceduresand techniques
for the protection of fundamental rights], in COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES EUROPEENNES
ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX

[EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS] 105-164 (Louis Favoreu ed., 1982).
61.

See WERNER HEUN, THE CONSTITUTION OF GERMANY. A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

175 (Hart Publishing 2011).
62. Fines can be as high as 2,600 Euros.
63. Art. 93a, cl.2 of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court.
64. Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht:
Procedure,Practiceand Policy of the German Federal ConstitutionalCourt, 3 J. COMP.
L. 194-211 (2008).

201l]

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON DIRECT ACCESS

3.

721

Spain

Spain represents a very interesting case study in the analysis of the
general effects that adoption of the ICC can have on a country's system
of judicial review.
Influenced by the example of the German
Verfassungsbeschwerde, the Spanish "individual appeal for protection"
(recurso de amparo) or "constitutional amparo" was introduced by
article 53, cl. 2 of the 1978 Constitution.
The constitutional amparo
was then implemented in the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court
enacted in 1979.
Today, in Spain, any natural and legal person (not just citizens) with
a "legitimate interest"67 can apply to the Tribunal Constitucional by
means of the constitutional amparo to challenge violations of the rights
protected in articles 14-30 of the 1978 Constitution caused by actions or
omissions of public powers. 68 More specifically, the constitutional
amparo can be exercised to challenge administrative acts, judicial
65. On the influence exerted by the German system of judicial review on the Spanish
Constitution, see Francisco Rubio Llorente, La jurisdiccion constitucional en Espaha
[The constitutional jurisdiction in Spain], in ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA JURISDICCION
CONSTITUCIONAL [STUDIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION] (Rubio Llorente & J.

Jimenez Campo eds., 1997).
66. However, a "recurso de amparo" had been originally established in Spain by the
1931 Constitution of the Spanish Second Republic, at that time influenced by both the
Austrian model of individual constitutional complaint adopted in 1920 and the Mexican
model. The 1931 Constitution created a Tribunal of Constitutional Guaranties vested
with the power to judge upon the constitutionality of statutes and to protect fundamental
rights by means of a recourse for constitutional protection: see, ALLAN R. BREWERCARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 74
(Cambridge University Press 2009); EDUARDO FERRER MAc-GREGOR, LA ACCI6N
CONSTITUCIONAL DE AMPARO EN MEXICO Y ESPAF4A, ESTUDIO DE DERECHO COMPARADO
[THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECOURSE OF AMPARO IN MEXICO AND SPAIN. A STUDY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW] (4th ed. 2007).
67. Article 162 of the Constitution.

68. See articles 53(2) and 161 of the 1978 Constitution of Spain and articles 41-47
and 50 of Organic Law on the Constitutional Court no. 2/1979 of Oct. 3, 1979 (last
amended in 2007). Provisions of the original 1979 Organic Law concerning the
constitutional amparo have been amended a few times: Organic Law no. 8/1984 amended

article 45 concerning use of the amparo for protection of the right to conscientious
objection; Organic Law of June 9, 1988, amended articles 50 and 86 concerning
admissibility criteria for the amparo; Organic Law no. 6/2007 introduced the requirement
of the "significant constitutional relevance" of the issue for the recourse to be declared
admissible. The rights protected are so-called "first" and "second" generation rights (that

is, civil and political), while "third" generation rights (social) cannot be protected through
the constitutional amparo, since they are listed at arts. 39 through 52; the same exclusion
applies to the rights to property, entrenched in art. 33. See DURAN M. CARRASCO, Los
PROCESOS PARA LA TUTELA JUDICIAL DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES [THE RECOURSE
FOR JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS] (Madri

onales 2002). For an overview of the structure and functions of the
Tribunal Constitucionalin Spain, see Enrique Guillkn L6pez, Judicial Review In Spain:
The ConstitutionalCourt, 41 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 529 (2008).
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decisions and legislative enactments-with the exclusion of statutory
laws-after prior exhaustion of all available legal remedies. 69
Since the enactment of the Constitution and the introduction of the
ICC, an increasing number of appeals for protection have reached the
Constitutional Court, most of them claiming violations of the rights
granted under article 24 of the Spanish Constitution: effective protection
from judges.70 As a consequence of the high number of individual
complaints filed with the Tribunal Constitucional, the functionality of
the body was significantly affected: most of the activity of the Tribunal
was devoted to deciding the appeals for constitutional amparo and, over
the years, the average time needed for the Court to perform all its
functions significantly increased, almost creating a real "crisis" for the
functionality of the Court.71
The structure of the constitutional amparo underwent therefore
significant reform in 2007, focusing on the requirements for accessing
2
The purpose of the reform was to limit
the Tribunal Constitucional.1
the possibility for individuals to directly access the Constitutional Court,
on the assumption that fundamental rights could and should be
protected-first and foremost-by ordinary judges and only afterward by
the Constitutional Court and exclusively in cases in which the plaintiff
69. Article 41 of the Organic law on the Constitutional Court states: "provisions,
legal enactments, omissions or flagrantly illegal actions by the public authorities of the
State, the Autonomous Communities and other territorial, corporate or institutional public
bodies, as well as their officials or agents." Article 47 of the Organic Law states that, in
cases in which a judicial decision is challenged, "[t]hose who benefited by the decision,
act or fact that led to the appeal or persons with a legitimate interest therein may appear
in the proceedings for constitutional protection as a defendant or additional party."
70. On this point see Miryam lacometti, La Spagna, [Spain], in DIRITTO
COSTITUZIONALE

COMPARATO

[COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW]

264

(Paolo

Carrozza, Alfonso Di Giovine & Giuseppe F. Ferrari eds., 2009).
71. Between 1980 and 1998, about 48,000 appeals for constitutional protection were
filed, with the number gradually increasing over the years. More specifically, in 1980 the
appeals were 218; in 1981, they were 393; 1982 (438); 1983 (834); 1984 (807); 1985
(970); 1986 (1,229); 1987 (1,659); 1988 (2,129); 1989 (2,604); 1990 (2,910); 1991
(2,707); 1992 (3,229); 1993 (3,877); 1994 (4,173); 1995 (4,369); 1996 (4,689); 1997
(5,391); 1998 (5,441). Of the 9,708 applications filed with the TribunalConstitucionalin
2005, 9,476 of them were individual appeals lodged with the constitutional amparo.
Figures are available on the website of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional:
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Prof. Tania Groppi
referred to this phenomenon as a "crisis of the amparo recourse." Tania Groppi, II ricorso
di aamparo) in Spagna: caratteri,problemi e prospettive [The Writ ofAmparo in Spain:
main features, problems and perspectives], 4340, in GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE
(1997); ENCARNA CARMONA CUENCA, LA CRISIS DEL RECURSO DE AMPARO: LA
PROTECClON DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES ENTRE EL PODER JUDICIAL Y EL TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUCIONAL [THE CRISIS OF THE AMPARO RECOURSE: THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BEFORE THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL]

(Alcald 2005).
72. Organic Law no. 6/2007.
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could demonstrate the novelty of the constitutional issues. The 2007
reform, therefore, introduced an additional accessibility requirement: the
applicant needed now demonstrate the "significant constitutional
relevance" of the recourse presented.74

Today, the vast majority of

applications lodged with the Court are declared inadmissible due to the
very lack of the constitutional nature of the alleged violation.75
A different statute of limitations applies to the various acts that can
be challenged: while legislative enactments can be challenged only
within three months from their approval, a constitutional amparo against
judicial decisions must be filed within thirty days from notification of the
decision.7 6
4.

Switzerland

The so-called "recourse in cases of public law" finds its basic
regulation in article 189 of the 1999 Federal Constitution of the Swiss

Confederation and in article 82 of the Law on the Federal Tribunal.77
According to these provisions, the Federal Supreme Court (the highest
Court of the system, vested with powers of judicial review in
Switzerland) has jurisdiction over complaints about violations of
constitutional rights prompted by judicial decisions issued in public-law
cases and by normative acts enacted by the administrative and legislative
bodies of the Cantons (i.e. the sub-national units of the federation). It
also has competence over applications filed by citizens for violations of

73.

Victor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish ConstitutionalCourt: Time for Reforms, in
193 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
74. In the original Spanish "trascendenciaconstitucional." See article 50(l)(b) of the
Organic law as amended in 2007. According to article 50(1) of the Organic Law, in order
for the recourse to have "significant relevance," the issue must be significant for the
"importance for the interpretation, application and general efficacy of the Constitution
and for a determination of the content and significance of fundamental rights." The
Constitutional Court has further specified this requirement in decision STC no. 155/2009.
75. Comella, supra note 73, at 193.
76. Id.
77. The current Constitution of the Confederation of Switzerland was adopted by
popular vote on April 18, 1999. The Constitution replaces the prior 1874 Federal
Constitution after a total revision intended to update the previous document without
changing its substance. The 1999 Constitution describes the Swiss Confederation as a
full-fledged federal republic composed of 26 Cantons (sub-national units). It also
includes a catalogue of individual and popular rights (including rights to call for popular
referenda on federal laws and constitutional amendments, in analogy to constitutionalinitiatives mechanisms included in several United States state constitutions) and indicates
the competences of the Cantons and the Federal Government. See ANDREAS AUER,
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

GIORGIO MALINVERNI, & MICHEL HOTIELIER, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL SUISSE [Swiss

2 (2006). Together with article 189 of the Constitution, articles
82, 86, 89, 113, 115 and 116 of the Law on the Federal Tribunal of June 17, 2005 detail
the procedure for lodging an individual constitutional complaint.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]
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the right to vote and of regulations on general election and popular
voting procedures. 8
According to article 89 of the Federal Judicature Act, the recourse
can be lodged with the Federal Supreme Court by those subjects who
were parties in a case (in case of judicial decisions) and by everyone who
is "significantly affected by the challenged decision or act" and who can
demonstrate a significant interest in the annulment of the acts. 7 9
The main purpose of the constitutional complaint is therefore to
protect citizens from the action of public powers; only indirectly does it
guarantee that unconstitutional laws are not kept in effect within the legal
systems.s0 The challenged acts can be of a legislative, judicial8 l or
administrative nature. However, an important limit to the system of
individual constitutional complaint, here, is determined by the fact that
only Cantonal acts-and not those of the Federation-can be challenged
for constitutionality 82 and only provided the absence at the Cantonal
level of any other legal remedy against the act.
The recourse must be lodged within thirty days from the judicial
decision or the entry into force of the act.
5.

Belgium

The original 1831 Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium has
undergone significant revision in recent years. The possibility for a legal
or natural person to lodge an individual constitutional complaint with the
Belgian Constitutional Court was introduced in 1988 to supplement the
already existing incidenter review. 83 In 2007, the original Cour
d'Arbitrage-whoseactivity had increasingly moved from mere policing

78.
79.
80.

See Federal Judicature Act, arts. 82 & 86 (1943).
Id. art. 89.
See Elena Ferioli, La Giustizia Costituzionale in Svizzera [ConstitutionalJustice

in Switzerland], in SISTEMI E MODELLI DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE
MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] 294 (Luca Mezzetti ed., 2009).

[SYSTEMS AND

81. Federal Judicature Act, arts. 83 & 90-93 (1943) specify further prerequisites for
judicial decisions to be challenged and decisions which are-at the opposite-excluded
from the complaint.
82. The Constitutions of the Cantons are, however, excluded. See CONSTITUTION
FEDERALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101 art. 51, cl. 2 (Swtiz.). Article
190 of the 1999 Federal Constitution has been consistently interpreted by the Federal
Tribunal as precluding the Tribunal from judging on the constitutionality of Federal acts.
Article 190 of the Federal Constitution states: "The Federal Supreme Court and the other
judicial authorities shall apply the federal acts and international law." This exclusion,
however, has recently been subject to significant exceptions. See Elena Ferioli, La
Svizzera [Switzerland], in DIRIrro COSTITUZIONALE COMPARATO 326 (Paolo Carrozza,

Alfonso Di Giovine & Giuseppe Franco Ferrari eds., 2009).
83. See 1831 CONST. art. 142 (BeIg.); Special Act Law of Jan. 6, 1989, MONITEUR
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, art. 2 (BeIg.).
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of the areas of competence of the federal government and the federated
units towards a role akin to a judge protecting the rights and liberties
entrenched in the Constitution-formally changed into a full-fledged
Constitutional Court (Cour Constitutionnelle) which now protects and
enforces the constitutional rights listed under Title I (arts. 8-32) and at
arts. 170, 172 and 191 of the Constitution. 8 4
The individual constitutional complaint can be lodged by a legal or
natural person to obtain a declaration of unconstitutionality within six
months of the enactment of the challenged normative act (generally,
federal statutes--ordinary and special-regional decrees, ordinances of
the Bruxelles Region and acts with the force of law issued by the
Executive).
A declaration of unconstitutionality has the effect of
annulling the challenged acts and-generally-acts retroactively.86
Similarly, a rejection of the constitutional challenge binds all judges to
the interpretation of the challenged norm given by the Court. 87
6.

Central and Eastern European States

The fall of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe and
the resulting need to establish new constitutional foundations for the
emerging democracies prompted a wave of constitution-making and
democracy-building characterized by the establishment, in the newly

independent states, of centralized systems of judicial review."
The
adoption of such systems was the product of an intense circulation of
models of constitutional justice. The German and Austrian models were
particularly influential not only for reasons of geographical and cultural
84.

See Elena Ferioli, Il Belgio [Belgium], in DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE COMPARATO

355 (Paolo Carrozza, Alfonso Di Giovine &
Giuseppe Franco Ferrari eds., 2009).
85. CONST. art. 142 (BeIg.).
86. See Nicola Vizioli, La giustizia costituzionalein Belgio [Constitutionaljustice in
[COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw]

Belgium], in ESPERIENZE DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE [EXPERIENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE] 491 (Jdrg Luther, Roberto Romboli & Rolando Tarchi eds., 2000); Paolo

Carrozza, La <<Cour d'Arbitrage) belga [The Belgian "Cour d'Arbitrage', in CORTI
NAZIONALI E COMPARAZIONE GIURIDICA [NATIONAL COURTS AND LEGAL COMPARISON] 105
(Giuseppe Franco Ferrari & Antonio Gambaro eds, 2006).
87. Special Act Law of Jan. 6, 1989, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Jan. 7, 1989, art. 9 (Belg.).
88. According by Prof. Andrew Harding, Constitutional Courts have become a key
element of constitutional design since, in addition to upholding values of legality and
constitutionalism, "[they] might be conceived as a device to counter-balance the
otherwise potentially overwhelming capacity of the elected majority to achieve
domination at the expense of any opposition" and "defending provisions intended to
protect human rights and minority rights." Moreover, "in many developing nations
negotiating a hazardous path to democracy, the constitutional court has come to be
regarded as a vital guarding of the constitution."
Andrew Harding, Preface, in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, I (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
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proximity, but also due to the role played by the Council of Europe in
processes of the revision of constitutional documents and constitutiondrafting. 89 The Council of Europe's special constitutional advisory body,
the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice
Commission), indeed stressed the importance of the creation of
constitutional courts as a fundamental element to recognize a country's
achieved democratic status and its adherence to the rule of law. 90
In these countries the creation of Constitutional Courts occurred, in
most cases,9 ' in conjunction with the introduction of systems of
individual constitutional complaint, designed to supplement the already
existing systems of incidenter review to access the Constitutional Court
vested with functions of judicial review. Moreover, the ICC system was
almost always introduced with the requirement of the previous
exhaustion of all available judicial remedies.
The individual constitutional complaint has been adopted in the
following countries: Republic of Albania, Armenia,93 Croatia,94 Czech
Republic,95 Estonia," Georgia,9 7 Hungary, Latvia, 99 Montenegro, 100

89. The German and Austrian models of constitutional justice have been so
influential that some commentators stated that "the establishing of constitutional review
was a clear case of constitutional borrowing." Kasia Lach & Wojciech Sadurski,
Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern Europe: Between Adolescence and
Maturity, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 58 (Andrew Harding &
Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
90. See Venice Commission, The Role of the Constitutional Court in the
Consolidation of the Rule of Law, in 10 SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUES OF DEMOCRACY

(1994). This follows Liszl6 S61yom's belief that "the very existence of these courts
obviously served as a 'trade mark,' or as a proof, of the democratic character of the
respective country." Liszl6 S61yom, The Role of ConstitutionalCourts in the Transition
to Democracy: With Special Reference to Hungary, 18 INT'L Soc. 133, 134 (2003). For
more information on the Council of Europe's role in these processes and in the
establishment

of constitutional courts,

see generally WOJCIECH SADURSKI,

RIGHTS

BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2007)

91. With the exception of Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, Moldova,
Romania.
92. See CONST., arts. 131 & 134 (1998) (Alb.).
93. For a description of individual appeals, see CONSTITUTION, Art. 101(6) (2005)
(Arm.); see also LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, arts. 25 & 69 (2006) (Arm.). In

addition to natural persons, legal persons are also eligible to apply directly to the
See CONSTITUTION, art. 42.1 (2005) (Arm.); see also
Constitutional Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL CT. ACT, art. 25 (2006).
94. See CONSTITUTION, art. 128 (1990) (Croat.). See also CONSTITUTIONAL ACT ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CT., arts. 30,40, & 62 (Official Gazette No. 49/2002) (Croat.).
95. See CONSTITUTION, art. 87 (1992) (Czech.); see also CONSTITUTIONAL CT. ACT,

arts. 64, 72, & 74 (1993) (Czech.).
96. See CONSTITUTION, art. 152 (1992) (Est.); see also LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW CT. PROCEDURE ACT, arts. 16 & 18 (Est.).
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Poland,10 ' Serbia, 10 2 Slovak Republic, 0 3 Slovenia,'1
the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,'s and Ukraine.10 6 Other eastern
European countries which did not adopt the ICC system when their
constitutions were drafted have subsequently considered its adoption. 0 7
The systems of individual constitutional complaints adopted in these
countries drew inspiration from the model provided by the guidelines of
Indeed, as we have seen, the Venice
the Venice Commission.
Commission favors the adoption of such a system for a variety of
97.

See CONSTITUTION,

art.

89

(1995) (Geor.); see also LAW ON THE
1 (1996) (Geor.); see also ORGANIC LAW ON
2004) (Geor.).

CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, art.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CT., art. 39 (amended

98. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 32/A (1949) (Hung.); see also ACT. No. XXXII ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CT., Arts. 1, 21, 38, & 48 (1989) (Hung.). See also CONSTITUTION, Art.

24 (enacted on April 25, 2011) (Hung.).
99. See CONSTITUTION, art. 85 (amended 2007) (Lat.); see also LAW ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CT., art. 19(2) (Lat.).
100. See CONSTITUTION, art. 149 (2007) (Montenegro); see also LAW ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CT. OF MONTENEGRO, arts. 48-59 (Official Gazette 64/2008)
(Montenegro).
101.

See CONSTITUTION, art. 79 (1997) (Pol.); see also CONSTITUTIONAL TRIB. ACT,

arts. 27 & 46 (1997) (Pol.)
102. The Constitution of 2006 introduced a system of constitutional complaint in
Serbia for the first time. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 168-170 (Serb.); see also LAW ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CT., arts. 82-90 (2007) (Serb.). For an overview of the ICC system in
Serbia, see Natasa Plavsic, Individual Constitutional Complaint: Serbian Model (2008)
(unpublished dissertation for the Comparing Constitutional Adjudication Summer School
(Co.Co.A.)
at
the
University
of
Trento,
Italy)
available
at
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/papers.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
103. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 127, 127(a), & 130 (1992) (Slovk.); see also LAW ON
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CT., arts. 18 & 49 (Slovk.).
104. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 160 & 162 (1991) (Slovn.); see also CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT ACT, arts. 24 & 50 (1994) (Slovn.). On the Slovenian ICC system, see Melart T.,

Zore L., The Individual Constitutional Complaint in Slovenia (2008) (unpublished
dissertation for Co.Co.A. at the University of Trento, Italy) available at
http:/www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/papers.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The paper
also describes in detail the strict criteria recently adopted to determine admissibility of
the recourses to promote judicial economy.
105. Article 110 of the 1991 Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and articles 11, 12, 28 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure were adopted by the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia on October 7, 1992.
106. Ukr. Const. of 1996, ch. 2, arts. 55, 150; Hpo KOHCTTyltiiiHIii Cyt YKpaiHH
[Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine] (promulgated by the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukr., Oct. 16, 1996, effective Oct. 22, 1996) 1996, No. 422/96-vr, arts. 42-43, available
at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-binlaws/main.cgi?nreg-422%2F96%2DE2%FO
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
107. This is the case, for example, in the Republic of Lithuania, whose Constitution,
adopted in 1992, did not contemplate a system of direct access to the Constitutional
Court.
However, the adoption of such a system has recently received serious
consideration: see Vitalija Tamavidilte, Individual ConstitutionalComplaint: Lithuanian
Perspective, Co.Co.A.
(Comparing
Constitutional
Adjudication)
(2008),
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cocoa/papers/PAPERS%203RD%20PDF/ICC%20Lithuania%20e
dit%20ok.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011)
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reasons, including that direct recourse to a constitutional court can
operate as filter for cases of alleged violations of fundamental rights
before they are lodged with the European Court of Human Rights,
helping to avoid overburdening of the Strasbourg Court. 0 s
Finally, of the main shared features of the ICC systems adopted in
these countries, the following should be noted and will be explored
further below: a) the requirement that an aggrieved party exhaust all
available legal remedies before filing a complaint with the Constitutional
Court;109 b) the right of an individual (in some jurisdictions) to file for
recourse against acts or actions of private entities (natural and legal
persons), provided they exercise public authority (generally, the acts that
can be challenged for violation of constitutionally protected rights are
0 c) the challengeability of not only statutes but
those of public powers);o"
also regulations, administrative acts, and more rarely, judicial
decisions;.' d) the ICC's use for challenging solely acts, and not
omissions, of public powers; e) the right (now in most countries) of legal
persons, like natural persons, to file an ICC with the Court;I12 f) the
practice of allowing an ICC only for actions of public powers that have
already occurred or legal enactments already in effect;" 3 g) the
declaration by the Constitutional Court that a constitutional right has
been violated with declarations of unconstitutionality of the act or action
at issue with erga omnes effects; h) the establishment (in some countries)
of statutes of limitations for the exercise of the ICC.114

108. See Venice Commission, supra note 8, at 4.
109. In Serbia, the ICC can be utilized without the previous exhaustion of all other
legal remedies in those cases in which a plaintiff's right to a trial within a reasonable time
has been violated.
110. For example, Croatia ("legal person exercising public authority"); Montenegro
("legal person vested with public powers"); Serbia ("organizations exercising delegated
public powers"); the FYRM.
111. Judicial decisions can be challenged in Czech Republic, Poland, Serbia, Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia.
112. Specifically: Armenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia,
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Ukraine. A few countries also allow
collective action: E.g., the Slovak Republic ("bodies of the territorial selfadministration").
113. Conversely, Georgia also allows challenge of an act which could infringe the
fundamental rights of a person.
114. For example: FYRM (within two months from entry into force of the act);
Montenegro (two months from act), Slovenia (two months from act); Poland (within
three months from judicial decision); Croatia (one year from entry into force of the
challenged act); and Albania (two years from act).

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON DIRECT ACCESS

2011]

7.

729

Other ECHR Signatory States

Because of the membership of the Republic of Turkey and the
Russian Federation in the regional system of human-rights protection
established.by the Council of Europe, it is appropriate we address briefly
these two jurisdictions under this 'European' section, in Part I of the
article.
With regard to the Republic of Turkey, a system of individual
constitutional complaint was introduced in September 2010 as the result
of approval by referendum of a package of amendments to the 1982
Turkish Constitution. 1"5 The recourse has been designed so that
individuals claiming that a public authority has infringed "rights within
the scope of the ECHR which are guaranteed by the Constitution" can
directly lodge an application with the Constitutional Court";6 a
recourse, therefore, seems limited only to those rights or freedoms
guaranteed by the ECHR that are also enumerated in the Constitution.
By establishing a domestic filter for cases of violations of fundamental
rights before they are lodged with the Strasbourg Court, this requirement
seems to respond to the Venice Commission's previously noted concern
of the overburdening of the ECtHR. 1 17 The Constitution also mandates
the exhaustion of all available legal remedies as a further admissibility
requirement and expressly notes that in cases of individual constitutional
complaints, judicial review "shall not be made for matters which would
be taken into account during the process of recourse to legal
remedies."' 18

115. See Law No. 5982 of July 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May. 13,
2010) (Turk.) [hereinafter Law No. 5982], available at http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/
Eskiler/2001/10/20011017M1.htm.
Official English translation available at THE
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY PRIME MINISTRY: SECRETARIAT GENERAL FOR EUROPEAN UNION

http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/BasC4%BlnMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_
amendments.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The referendum, which confirmed the
package of amendments to the Constitution originally submitted to the Turkish Grand
National Assembly on March 30, 2010, was held on September 12, 2010, adopted by the
Assembly on May 7, 2010, and published in the Official Gazette on May 13, 2010.
116. The revised text of article 148 prescribes in relevant part that
Everyone may apply to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of
the fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of the European
Convention on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution has
been violated by public authorities. In order to make an application, ordinary
legal remedies must be exhausted. In the individual application, judicial
review shall not be made for matters which would be taken into account
during the process of recourse to legal remedies. Procedures and principles
concerning the individual application shall be laid down in law.
Law No. 5982.
117. See Venice Commission, supra note 8, at 4.
118. See Turk. CONST. art. 148/1.
AFFAIRS,
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With regard to the Russian Federation, a system of direct recourse
to the Constitutional Court was first introduced in 1991, when the
Constitutional Court of Russia was created."' 9 This Court, whose design
drew inspiration from the systems of judicial review adopted in Austria,
Germany and Italy, operated until 1993 (when then-President Boris
Yeltsin suspended its activity 2 0) under the 1978 Constitution of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republics ("RSFSR"), as revised in
December 1990.121 Under this first system of individual constitutional
complaint, citizens claiming a violation of constitutionally protected
rights could apply directly to the Constitutional Court and challenge
every "application of law" by a public power, i.e., after the previous
exhaustion of all available legal remedies. Citizens were therefore
allowed to challenge not only statutory laws but also other normative
* *122
acts and legislative omissions.
After the new Constitution for the Russian Federation had been
adopted by national referendum on December 12, 1993, a new federal
constitutional law on the Constitutional Court was enacted in 1994, and
the Court eventually resumed its activity in February 1995.123 A new
typology of direct access to the Constitutional Court-significantly
different from the previous-was introduced. 124 According to the 1994

119. The Constitutional Court of Russia was established in 1991 with the Law "On
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic." Vedomosti
S'yezda Narodnykh Deputatov i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR [The Bulletin of the
Congress of People's Deputies and of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR], July 25, 1991,
No. 30, Art. 1017. The Court initiated its activity at the end of October 1991. In
December 1991, the former USSR was dissolved, leaving its constituents as independent
states. For a thorough analysis of the history, structure and functions of the Russian
Constitutional Court, see ALEXEi TROCHEv, JUDGING RUSSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN
RUSSIAN POLITICS, 1990-2006 (Cambridge University Press 2008).

120. The suspension was announced after the opinion issued by the Court on
September 21, 1993, which declared unconstitutional the act with which President Boris
Yeltsin had dissolved the country's legislature. Finding No. 2-Z of Sept. 21, 1993, (On
Conformity of the Actions and Decisions of the Russian President with the Constitution),
Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF (Bulletin of the RF Constitutional Court) 1994, No.
6, p. 40.
121. See Law on the Improvement of the System of State Management, 1990. On the
influence of the Austrian, German and Italian models of judicial review see Herbert
Hausmaninger, From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian
ConstitutionalCourt, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305, 332 (1992).
122. Angela Di Gregorio, La Corte costituzionale della Russia [The Constitutional
Court of Russia], in SISTEMI E MODELLI DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 447 (Luca

Mezzetti ed., 2009).
123. Id.
124. KONSTITUTSHIA RosslISKOi FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 125
(Russ.); Federal'nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon [FKZ] [Federal Constitutional Law],
OKonstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. Sud RF] [On the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROssiISKOI FEDERATSII
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Federal Constitutional Law, the application can be lodged with the Court
by natural persons (citizens as well as foreign nationals and stateless),
groups, legal persons and associations for an alleged violation of
constitutional rights. The violation must have been determined by
legislation (only statutory law)125 applied or likely to be applied to a
concrete case whose analysis before a judicial body has already been
initiated.' 26 This last admissibility requirement changes therefore the
new direct constitutional complaint adopted in the Russian federation
into a hybrid between an incidenter review system and a pure individual
constitutional complaint. 2 7
In order to complete the overview of signatory countries to the
ECHR, it is worth mentioning that other relevant European jurisdictions
have adopted systems of individual constitutional complaint. These are:
the Hellenic Republic (Greece),1 28 the Principality of Andorra,12 9 the
Principality of Liechtenstein,' 3 0 the Republic of Cyprus,13' and the
Republic of San Marino.' 32

[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No. 13, Item 1447, art. 3,
96-100.
125. It is no longer possible to challenge a legislative omission.
126. Federal'nyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon [FKZ] [Federal Constitutional Law],
OKonstitutsionnyi Sud Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. Sud RF] [On the Constitutional
Court of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA RoSsIISKOi FEDERATSII
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 1994, No. 13, Item 1447, art. 97.
127. See supra note 121, at 460-61.
128. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 100. (Gr.) and art. 48 of Law no.
345 establishes the Special Highest Court and states that "where conflicting judgments
have been delivered by the Council of State, the Supreme Court or the Controllers
Council as to the assessment of the constitutionality of a law or its interpretation, the
Special Highest Court shall resolve the conflict at the request of: .. . b. any person having
a lawful interest."
129. LA CONSTITUCIO DEL PRINCIPAT D'ANDORRA [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 28, 1993, arts.
41.1, 102 (Andorra) and Llei Qualificada de la Justicia [Qualified Law on the
Constitutional Court] Titles V-VI, art. 85-96 (Andorra), which describe the so-called
"empara" appeal, also called "appeal for constitutional protection." Interestingly, the
empara appeal is excluded for the rights protected in article 22 of the Constitution: denial
of residence permit renewal and expulsion of a lawful resident.
130. CONSTITUTION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN Oct. 5, 1921, LR 101, art.
43, 104); uber den Staatsgerichtshof (StGHG) [The Constitutional Court Act],
Liechtensteinsches Landesgesetzblatt, Nr. 32, Jan. 20, 2004, arts. 15 & 20 (Liech.).
131. CYPRUS, CMND. 1093 [CONSTITUTION] 1960, art. 146. Here the ICC can also be
activated to challenge an omission of the public powers.
132. Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the Fundamental Principles of the San
Marinese Legal Order, Albo del Pubblico Palazzo, no. 59, art. 16, July 8, 1974 (allowing
"a number of citizens entitled to vote representing a minimum of 1.5% of the electorate"
to lodge a direct question of constitutionality of "laws and normative acts" with the
Collegio Garante in order to determine their compatibility with the fundamental
principles expressed in the Declaration and in the laws referred to in the Declaration
itself).
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Asia

Latin America and Europe are not the only regions in the world
hosting countries that have adopted systems of direct access to
constitutional and supreme courts for the protection of fundamental
rights. Several Asian countries-under the positive influence exerted by
the Austrian, German and Mexican models of judicial review-have
introduced systems of individual constitutional complaint.
Among these, the following are worth mentioning: the Republic of
Azerbaijan,13 3 the Republic of China (Taiwan),134 the Republic of
India, 135 the Republic of Indonesia,136 the Republic of Korea (South
Korea), 137 the Republic of Mongolia,' 38 and the Republic of the
Philippines. 139

133. CONSTITUTION OF THE AZERBAl)AN REPUBLIC 1995, art. 130, cl. V; The Law of
available at
34,
art.
Court,
Constitutional
on
Republic
Azerbaijan
http://www.constcourt.gov.az/en/download/legislation/law-on constitutionalcourt.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
134. MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] art. 78, 79 (1947) (Taiwan); article 5 of the
Law of Procedure. The petition to the Taiwanese Council of Grand Justices (Judicial
Yuan, the country's Constitutional Court) for constitutional interpretation can be filed in
case of infringement of constitutional rights due to an unconstitutional act or judicial
decision, after previous exhaustion of all available legal remedies. If the petition
challenges a judicial decision, it must be lodged within three months after the decision
has become final, but if the decision becomes final because the losing party failed to

propose an appeal, it is deemed that the petitioner did not exhaust all the applicable
remedies. See ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS INASIAN CASES 106 (2003).
135. INDIA CONST. art. 32. The protection of citizens' rights represents a fundamental
component of the Indian Constitution. The ICC can be activated for protection of the
constitutional rights listed in INDIA CONST. art. 12-51A, against unconstitutional

legislation and unconstitutional acts or actions of the administrative powers.

See

GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF ANATION (1999). See

Domenico Amirante, Giustizia Costituzionale e affermazione della democrazia
nell'Unione indiana [Constitutional Justice and Establishment of Democracy in the
Indian Union], in SISTEMI E MODELLI DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 757 (Luca Mezzetti

ed., 2009).
136. Organic Law no. 24/2003 and Constitutional Court Regulation, No.
06/PMK/2005, On The Procedures of Judicial Review of Law, art. 3 (Indonesia). In
Indonesia, the ICC as a means to access the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi)

for protection of fundamental rights is reserved only to Indonesian citizens, either
individually or as a "group of people having the same interest."
137. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, July 12, 1948, art. 111, cl. 5;
Constitutional Court Act, arts. 2, 41 & 68, available at http://english.ccourt.go.kr/ (follow
the "Constitutional Court Act" link) (lasted visited Apr. 1, 2011). The Act links the ICC
to a challenge to the constitutionality of an act for violation of the basic rights protected
in the Constitution. The complaint can be filed-after previous exhaustion of all legal
remedies-for actions or omissions of the public powers (however, court judgments are
See ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
excluded).
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 220 (2003); see Tania Groppi, Costituzioni

senza costituzionalismo? La codificazione dei diritti in Asia agli inizi del XI secolo
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Africa

A complete analysis of all the jurisdictions in the world that have
adopted systems of direct access to constitutional and supreme courts is
beyond the scope of this work. However, the system of direct access to
the Constitutional Court set up in the Republic of South Africal 4 0
deserves to be mentioned for the rather strict criteria that the Court has
applied to review applications of those citizens seeking direct access.
Under the 1993 Interim Constitution, direct access to the
Constitutional Court was regulated by article 100(2) of the Constitution
and article 17 of the 1995 Rules of the Constitutional Court, which
established a quite strict requirement for the admissibility of the direct
recourse. According to article 17 of the 1995 Rules, application for direct
access could be made "in exceptional circumstances only, which will
[Constitution without Constitutionalism? The Codification of Rights in Asia at the
Beginning of the 21st Century], 2 POLITICA DEL DIRITTO 186, 210 (2006).

138. Art. 66(1) of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Mongolia. Citizens can
file a petition with the Mongolian Constitutional Court (Tsets, i.e., referee) without
needing to show legal injury or previous exhaustion of other legal remedies. This openstanding policy makes up for the impossibility for ordinary courts to apply "incidenter" to
the Constitutional Court in the course of ongoing legal proceedings and the consequential
impossibility for the Tsets to review the constitutionality of ordinary court decisions.
According to Prof Ginsburg, "these open-standing provisions . . . meant that the Court
provided an easily accessible alternative forum for those political forces that had been
defeated in the legislative arena. Unsurprisingly, this would ultimately lead to the
politicization of the Court." GINSBURG, supra note 137, at 167-68.
139. The writ of amparo, together with the writ of habeas data, was introduced in the
Philippines in 2007 by the Supreme Court through the adoption of Resolution A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC of September 25, 2007, on the "Rule on the Writ of Amparo" to supplement
the already existing writ of habeas corpus disciplined under Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of the Court. The legal basis for introduction of the two writs was article VIII,
section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which vests the Supreme Court with the power to
"promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights ...
Both writs were adopted to help face the extensive extrajudicial killings and forced
disappearances that have been occurring in the Philippines since 1989. According to Sec.
I of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the recourse - which covers a limited number of
rights - protects the right to life, liberty, and security from violation or threat by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The influence of the Mexican and Latin American conception of amparo is clear.
The first decision on a writ of Amparo was issued by the Supreme Court on October 7,
2008, in the case Secretary of National Defense vs. Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
(G.R. No. 180906).
140. See S. AFR. CONsT. 1996 art.167(6)(a); see also Rules of the Court, GN RI675
art.18 in (GG) 25726 of Oct. 31, 2003. For recent contributions on this topic, see Brice
Dickson, Human Rights on the Eve of the Next Century: Aspects of Human Rights
Implementation. ProtectingHuman Rights Through a ConstitutionalCourt: The Case of
South Africa, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (1997); see also Jackie Dugard, Court of First
Instance? Towards a Pro-PoorJurisdictionfor the South African Constitutional Court,
22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 261 (2006); Andrea Lollini, La Corte costituzionale sudafricana
[The South African Constitutional Court], in SISTEMI E MODELLI, supra note 80, at 785.
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ordinarily exist only where the matter is of such urgency, or otherwise of
such public importance, that the delay necessitated by the use of the
ordinary procedures would prejudice the public interest or prejudice the
ends of justice and good government."'41 While such requirements were
reproduced in the 1998 Rules of the Constitutional Court, they have not
been included in the current 2003 Rules.14 2
Article 167(6)(a) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa provides
that a petition for direct recourse can be lodged only "in the interest of
justice and with leave of the Constitutional Court." 4 3 Even in the
absence of further specifications in article 18 ("Direct Access") of the
2003 Rules currently in effect,'" the Court has nonetheless kept referring
to the necessary presence of the "urgency" and "public importance"
requirements as conditions for being granted direct access to the
Constitutional Court.14 5 Over time, the Court has become increasingly
selective in deciding under what circumstances it will grant direct access
to the Court. Clear in the Constitutional Court's approach to the
evaluation of the admissibility of a direct recourse is the view that
individuals should preferably lodge their claims with ordinary courts
first, so that these claims can reach the Constitutional Court only after
other courts have pronounced on the dispute. Claims should therefore be
argued up through the lower courts and get a full development of the
facts and legal arguments before the case reaches the Court.146
Moreover, direct access to the Constitutional Court should be reserved
only for truly exceptional circumstances.14 7

141. Rules of the Constitutional Court, (Regulation Gazette) no. 5450 art 17 of Jan. 6,
1995.
142. See Rules of the Constitutional Court, (Regulation Gazette) no. 6199 of May 29,
1998, GN R757. In a number of aspects, the 2003 Rules have simplified the procedures
that existed under the 1998 Rules, especially with regard to direct appeals to the
Constitutional Court.
143. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art.167(6)(a).
144. On this point, see Theunis Roux, Turning a DeafEar: The Right to Be Heard by
the ConstitutionalCourt, 13 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 216 (1997); S. Matela., Direct Access
to ConstitutionalCourt, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 333 (1998).
145. ChristianEducation of South Africa v. The Ministry of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR
1449 (CC), 1999 (2) SA 83 (CC) (S. Afr.).
146. See HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA. A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 230 ff. (Peter Leyland & Andrew Harding eds., Hart Publishing 2010).
147. Bruce and Another v. Fleecytex Johannesburg CC and Others 1998 (4) BCLR
415 (CC), 1998 (2) SA 1143 (CC), at 4, 8; (S. Aft.); Moseneke and Others v. The
Minister of the High Court 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC), 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC) at 19 (S.
Afr.); see also ZIYAD MOTALA & CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ANALYSIS
AND CASES 60 (Oxford University Press 2002).
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II.

INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT AND THE ITALIAN
SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVw

A.

Overview of the Italian System ofJudicialReview
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In the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe witnessed the
establishment in some European States of so-called "centralized"
systems of judicial review, which vested the power to review the
constitutionality of norms or actions in a single specialized Court situated
outside of the traditional structure of the judicial branch. 148 At the time
when the Italian Constituent Assembly started working on the draft of a
new constitution for the newly established Republic of Italy, two models
of judicial review were widely known: the Austrian (or Kelsenian)
centralized model and the United States decentralized one.149 Members
of the Constituent Assembly150 designed for Italy a model of judicial
review that had no precedent at that time and that can be defined as a
compromise between the centralized and the decentralized systems of
judicial review. This special model made the Italian system of judicial
review stand out among the Western systems of constitutional control.
The 1948 Constitution of the Italian Republic provided for the
establishment-for the first time in the Italian constitutional history-of
5
a Constitutional Court ("Corte Costituzionale").1
'
The idea of

148. This is the so-called "second generation" of constitutional courts. According to
this classification, "first generation" constitutional courts are those established in Europe
in the 1920s and 1930s (Austria, Czechoslovakia, 11 Republic Spain). "Second
generation" are the constitutional courts established in Italy and Germany in the mid1940s while the "third generation" include constitutional courts established in countries
that achieved full democracy only in the 1970s, like Greece, Spain and Portugal. Finally,
the "fourth generation" would be represented by those established in former socialist
countries in central and eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s: see Roberto
Romboli & Rolando Tarchi, Giustizia Costituzionale in Spagna [ConstitutionalJustice in
Spain] in 2 ESPERIENZE DI GIUSTIZIA 290 n.15 (Jeorg Luther, Roberto Romboli & Rolando
Tarchi eds., 2000).
149. See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the
Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183, 185-86 (1942), explaining that
Austria's 1920 constitution prohibited ordinary courts from reviewing the
constitutionality of statutes; this task was left to a special Constitutional Court.
150. The Constituent Assembly was elected at the same time the constitutional
referendum was held on June 2, 1946, in which Italian citizens chose a republican form
of government for Italy over the previous monarchic regime under the House of Savoy.
The constitutional referendum marked the first time in Italy that women were allowed to
vote. The Assembly conducted its activities from June 25, 1946, until January 31, 1948.
151. For recent English materials on the Italian Constitutional Court, see Alessandro
Pizzorusso, Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial Review of
Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 373 (1990);
Antonio Baldassarre, Structure and Organization of the Italian ConstitutionalCourt, 40
ST. LouIs U. L.J. 649 (1996); Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication and

736

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

entrusting the constitutional control of legislation to an ad hoc body was
indeed unknown to the previous Italian constitutional experience under
the Albertine Statute ("Statuto
the 1848 "flexible" constitution:

Albertino").15 2
Italian legal scholars have identified three main reasons for the
introduction of a system of constitutional justice in Italy in 1948: a) the
need to guarantee the "rigidity" of the new Republican Constitution,
protecting it against infringements in the form of statutory law
inconsistent with the Constitution enacted by a transient political
majority in the Parliament; b) the need to establish a 'judge of freedoms'
to whom the protection of the fundamental rights entrenched in the new
Republican Constitution could be entrusted and c) the need to identify an

Democracy. Comparative Perspectives: USA, France,Italy, 11 RATIO JURIS 38 (1998);
William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons
for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. I (1999);
MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

(2000); Daniel S. Dengler, The Italian Constitutional Court: Safeguard of the
Constitution, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 363 (2001); Tania Groppi, The Italian Constitutional
Court: Towards a 'Multilevel System' of Constitutional Review? 23 J. COMP. L. 100
(2008); Justin 0. Frosini, ConstitutionalJustice, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN PUBLIC
LAW 183 (Giuseppe Franco Ferrari ed., 2008); Louis F. Del Duca, Introduction of
Judicial Review in Italy-Transitionfrom Decentralized to Centralized Review (19481956)-A Successful Transplant Case Study, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 357 (2010);
Giuseppe Franco Ferrari & Antonio Gambaro, The Italian Constitutional Court and
A Premise, I COMP. L. REv. 1 (2010), available at
Comparative Law.
http://www.comparativelawreview.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); Elisabetta Lamarque,
Interpreting Statutes in Conformity with the Constitution: The Role of the Constitutional
Court and Ordinary Judges, 2 IT. J. PUB. L. 91 (2010), available at http://www.ijpl.eu
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010). An overview of the most important decisions of the Italian
Constitutional Court is available in French. See Tania Groppi, Les grandes ddcisions de
la Cour constitutionnelle italienne [The Great Decisions of the Italian Constitutional
Court], in LES GRANDES DECISIONS DES COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES EUROPEENNES [THE
GREAT DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS] (Pierre Bon & Didier
Maus eds., 2008). An English translation of a selection of the most important decisions
of the Italian Constitutional Court is available on the website of the Court at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ ActionPagina_325.do (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
Finally, in 1972, current Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Samuel
Alito conducted a comprehensive study on the Italian Constitutional Court in order to
draft his senior thesis at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
The study is currently available for download from the website of the Seeley G. Mudd
Manuscript Library of the University of Princeton: see SAMUEL A. ALiTO, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (May 31, 1972) (unpublished
senior thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/ -mudd/news/Alito thesis.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
152. The Albertine Statute ("Statuto Albertino") was the Constitution that King
Vittorio Emanuele conceded to the Kingdom of Sardinia on March 4, 1848. In 1861, the
Statuto became the Constitution of the now unified Kingdom of Italy and remained in
force until 1947. It is conventionally qualified as a "flexible constitution" since it did not
require any special procedure-that is, different from the ordinary legislative
procedure-nor any parliamentary supermajority to be amended.
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institutional body that could adjudicate controversies between different
organs of the State and between the State and the sub-national units (the
Regions) of the newly created regional State. 5 3
The Court is therefore a special body acting in a judicial manner for
the safeguarding of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of the
citizens against infringements originating from the legislative body in the
form of unconstitutional statutory laws or acts with the force of law. It is
the only institution vested with the power to decide questions regarding
the constitutionality of laws.15 4
Articles 134-137'15 of the 1948 Constitution define the main
features, structure and functions of the Court.156
Although the
Constitution became effective in 1948, the Constitutional Court was
actually established only in 1956,17 after the necessary implementing
legislation was enacted-mainly through constitutional laws-in 1948
and 1953.158 The adoption of a centralized-or Kelsenian-model of
judicial review was tempered with some elements taken from the
153.

See Enzo Cheli & Filippo Donati, Methods and Criteria of Judgment on the

Question of Rights to Freedom in

Italy, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A

(David M. Beatty ed., 1994).
154. See Art. 134 Costituzione (It.). Primary sources of law (statutes and acts with
the force of law) are the only two types of sources of law that the Constitutional Court
can review for constitutionality. Regulations and other secondary sources of law are
excluded from its scrutiny.
155. The English text of the Italian Constitution is available on the website of the
Italian
Senate
at
http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione inglese.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
156. The Corte Costituzionale is composed of fifteen judges, 1/3 appointed by the
Parliament in joint session, 1/3 by the President of the Republic and 1/3 by the Supreme,
ordinary, and administrative Courts (the Court of Cassation, the Council of State, and the
Court of Accounts). See Art. 135 Cost. (It.).
157. The Constitutional Court was not established until 1956 due to political
difficulties in selecting its judges. After the enactment of the Constitution and before the
establishment of the Constitutional Court (1948-1956), Italy experimented with a
decentralized system of judicial review, where ordinary courts could refuse to apply those
laws they deemed unconstitutional.
See Transitory and Final Provisions of the
Constitution no. VII, supra note 153, for availability. The experience has been criticized,
due to the resistance of the judges to implement the innovative provisions and principles
of the new Constitution: see Piero Calamandrei, La Costituzione e le leggi per attuarla.
(Come sifa a disfare una Costituzione) [The Constitution and implementing laws (How
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 227, 228-29

to unmake a Constitution)], in DIECI ANNI DOPO: 1945-1955:
DEMOCRATICA

ITALIANA

[TEN YEARS LATER:

1945-1955.

SAGGI SULLA VITA

ESSAYS

ON THE ITALIAN

DEMOCRACY] (Achille Battaglia et al. eds., 1955). See also John Henry Merryman &

Vincenzo Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J.
COMP. L. 665 (1966-1967).
158. The laws that implemented art. 137 Cost. (It.) are Constitutional Law no. 1/1948,
enacted on February 9, 1948; Constitutional Law no. 1/1953, enacted on March 11, 1953;
and Law no. 87/1953, enacted on March 11, 1953. Arts. 23-24 of the Law define
procedures to access the Constitutional Court.
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decentralized model vesting every ordinary and administrative judge
with the power to raise a question of the constitutional validity of the
norms he or she had to apply in the case before him or her.'" 9 Therefore,
while the system was, on one hand, marked by an "abstract" review of
the constitutionality of the challenged statutory law or act with the force
of law, on the other hand it was also "concrete" in the sense that it was
triggered by a real controversy that had arisen before an ad hoc judge
called to apply the challenged norm in the adjudication of a specific case.
Besides those cases in which a claim of unconstitutionality can be
lodged directly with the Constitutional Court by the Central Government
or the Regions (so-called "principaliter" proceedings),160 questions of the
constitutionality of legislation usually reach the Court through
"incidenter" proceedings.
Through these "incidenter" proceedings,
claims can be brought before the Constitutional Court in two ways:
issues arising in the course of civil, criminal, or administrative
proceedings may come before the Court upon petition of either party or
upon the ad hoc judge's own initiative (so called "incidenter" review).161
If the ad hoc judge considers the issue of constitutionality "not
manifestly unfounded" ("giudizio di non manifesta infondatezza") and
the challenged statutory law "relevant" ("giudizio di rilevanza")-thatis,
necessary in order to issue a decision-then the judge is bound to stay
the trial and refer the matter with a "certification order" to the
Constitutional Court, whose decisions, according to article 137 of the
159.

For an account of this discussion in the Constituent Assembly, see 5 LA

DELL'ASSEMBLEA
NEGLI ATTI PREPARATORI
DELLA REPUBBLICA
COSTITUZIONE
COSTITUENTE [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
For a recent
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY], 3657 (Italian Chamber of Deputies 1970).

comment on this debate, see Roberto Romboli, Riforma della giustizia costituzionale e
ruolo della magistratura [Reform of the Justice System and Role of the Judges], 1
QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 122 (1998).
160. The principaliter proceeding is regulated by article 127 of the Italian
Constitution, last amended in 2001. Art. 127 Costituzione (It.). This proceeding can be
used by the State to lodge a claim against a regional law and by the Regions to file a
complaint against a state law. According to article 127 of the Constitution, both the State
and the Regions have sixty days following publication of the regional or state law in the
Official Gazette to file a claim with the Constitutional Court. Id. A Region may also
take action against a law approved by another Region. See Frosini, supra note 151, at
198.
161. On the difference between "incidenter" and "principaliter" review, see MAURO
CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 69 (1971),

where the

author states that "while the decentralized system encourages private parties to introduce
constitutional issues before ordinary tribunals in connection with regular judicial
proceedings (review "incidenter"), the centralized approach tends, at least in its
archetypal form, to emphasize presentation of constitutional issues before special
constitutional courts via special actions initiated by various governmental authorities
(review "principaliter")." See id. at 47 for information on centralized and decentralized
power structures.
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Constitution, are final.162 In order for the question of constitutionality to
be admissible, the a quo judge is requested to indicate in the certification
order-together with the relevance and plausibility of the question-the
law challenged and the constitutional provisions allegedly violated by the
law.
With regard to the cases submitted by the ad hoc judge, the
Constitutional Court does not decide on the merits of the dispute but,
instead, only on the compatibility of the law with the Constitution. With
regard to individuals, this is the only way to access the Constitutional
Court. When an individual believes that one of his or her fundamental
constitutional rights has been violated by a State or a Regional statutory
law, the only way he or she can request the Constitutional Court to judge
the constitutionality of the law is to file a case before an ordinary or
administrative court and have the question of constitutionality raised
before the Constitutional Court by the ad hoc judge. Only State and
Regional Governments can directly refer issues of constitutionality to the
Court, claiming that the area of reserved competences the Constitution
assigns them has been encroached.
The only exception to the rule that an individual generally lacks the
power to challenge a law by lodging an application directly with the
Constitutional Court can be found in the Special Statute for the TrentinoAlto Adige Region. 163 Indeed, Article 98 of the Special Statutel 64 allows
the President of the Region or of one of the two Provinces of Trento and
Bolzano (following resolution of the Regional or Provincial legislative
body) to directly raise an issue of constitutionality before the
Constitutional Court, challenging a law or an act with the force of law
adopted by the State and claiming a violation of the Trentino-Alto Adige
Statute (which enjoys constitutional status) or the principle of protection
of German and Ladin minorities. The special nature of the action, the
162. See Article I of Constitutional Law no. 1/1948 (It.) and Article 23 of Law no.
87/1953 (It.).
163. Enacted with Constitutional Law no. 5/1948 (It.) of Feb. 26, 1948.
164. Art. 98 of the Special Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region (1972),
available at http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/diritto/statutoit.html#rl4 (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
1. Laws and acts having the force of law of the Republic can be contested by
the President of the Region or of the Province following a resolution of the
respective Parliament, for violation of the present Statute or of the principle of
protection of the German and Ladin linguistic minorities.
2. Should an Act by the State encroach upon the sphere of competence
assigned by the present Statute to the Region or the Provinces, the Region or
the respective Province may appeal to the Constitutional Court for a ruling in
regard to the matter of competence.
3. The appeal shall be lodged by the President of the Region or that of the
Province, following a resolution by the respective Government.
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category of individuals authorized to raise an issue of constitutionality of
the law, and the possibility to challenge the law-not only on grounds of
encroachment of the competences, but also for protection of fundamental
rights (protection of German and Ladin minorities)-are all elements that
show the differences between this mechanism and the incidenter control
of constitutionality. It should be noted, however, that this exception does
not in any way diminish the validity of the general rule that an individual
does not normally have the right to apply directly to the Court.
B.

ProposalsofIntroduction of a System ofIndividual Constitutional
Complaint in Italy. The FirstFifty Years: 1947-1997

When the Italian Constituent Assembly, back in 1947, was in the
process of drafting the Constitution and deciding on the adoption of a
centralized model of judicial review, it also considered the possibility of
introducing a mechanism of individual constitutional complaint.
According to the text approved by the second section of the second
subcommittee of the Constituent Assembly on January 24, 1947, every
citizen could have challenged a law-within one year from the law's
the Constitutional Court on grounds of
enactment-before
66
The text of the provision, intended to be
unconstitutionality.'
165. For an account of the projects addressing the introduction of the ICC and
presented during the work of the Constituent Assembly, see CARLO MEZZANOTTE, IL
GIUDIZIO SULLE LEGGI. VOL. 1. LE IDEOLOGIE DEL COSTITUENTE [JUDICIAL REVIEW OF

LEGISLATION. VOL. 1. THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE CONSTITUENTS] (1979); Tania Groppi, II

ricorso di <<amparom in Spagna, cit., p. 4340; Giuseppe Volpe, L'accesso alla giustizia
costituzionale: le origini di un modello[Access to constitutionaljustice: the origins of a
model], in L'ACCESSO ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE: CARATTERI, LIMITI, PROSPETTIVE
DI UN MODELLO [ACCESS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: FEATURES, LIMITS, PERSPECTIVES OF

A MODEL] 3 (Roberto Romboli ed., 2006).

166. The approved text stated: "Anybody, within the term of one year [from the
enactment] can challenge a law before the Constitutional Court on ground of its
unconstitutionality. A rejected claim of unconstitutionality will be banned from being
again lodged." The transcript of the proceedings of the second section of the second
at
available
are
subcommittee
http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/05appendici/06p2/06p2t6/03/01/index.htm?001.htm&2
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The original Italian: "Chiunque, entro il termine di un anno,
pu6 impugnare una legge avanti la Corte per incostituzionalitA. Una domanda di
Available at
incostituzionalitA respinta non pu6 essere pitt riproposta."
http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/05appendici/06p2/06p2t6/ 03/01/index.htm?001.htm&2
at the bottom (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). See also FRANCESCO RIGANO, COSTITUZIONE E
POTERE GIUDIZIARIO: RICERCA SULLA FORMAZIONE DELLE NORME COSTITUZIONALI [THE
STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONSTITUTION AND POWER OF THE JUDICIARY.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS] 240 (1982); ROBERTO ROMBOu, IL GIUDIZIO COSTITUZIONALE
INCIDENTALE COME PROCESSO SENZA PARTI [INCIDENTER JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A TRIAL
WITHOUT PARTIES] 17 (1985); CARLO MEZZANOTTE, IL GIUDIZIO SULLE LEGGI, cit.;

Lorenza Carlassare, I diritti davanti alla Corte costituzionale: ricorso individuale o
rilettura dell'art. 27 L. n. 87/1953? [Rights before the Constitutional Court: Individual
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incorporated into the Second Part of the Constitution, was drafted at that
stage in a broad fashion, without any further information on the acts that
could have been challenged (the text refers generically to "laws," without
further explaining if the term includes both State and Regional laws and
also acts with the force of law), or on the circumstances allowing
recourse (no reference was made to the infringement of fundamental
rights, but only to the alleged unconstitutionality of a law). Any
reference to the ICC, however, was eventually excluded by the Editorial
Committee of the Constituent Assembly from the text of the draft
Constitution submitted to the Constituent Assembly for approval.
On December 2, 1947, reference to the ICC was made again in two
amendments to the draft Constitution, both presented during the debate
before the Constituent Assembly. The text of the proposed amendments
was more carefully drafted, and some additional elements were
introduced with regard to the circumstances granting access to the
Constitutional Court. 6 9 Indeed, Giuseppe Codacci Pisanelli, one of the
members of the Constituent Assembly, presented an amendment to the
text under scrutiny, which vested the power to raise a question of
constitutionality before the Constitutional Court with "every citizen who
could demonstrate to have an interest [in raising the question] due to a
harm inflicted to his constitutionally guaranteed rights or interests." 6 9
This second amendment was introduced, on that same day, by
Costantino Mortati, proposing that "a recourse for constitutional
illegitimacy can be lodged directly with the Constitutional Court within

the term of prescription established by law, by those subjects who claim
a direct harm to a right or to a legitimate interest deriving from a
11170
statutory provision....

constitutionalcomplaint or a new reading ofart. 27 Law no. 87/1953?] in DIR. ESOCIETA
443 (1997).
167. See LA COSTITUZIONE
DELLA REPUBBLICA
NEGLI
ATTI PREPARATORI
DELL'ASSEMBLEA COSTITUENTE, supra note 159.
168. See id.
169. The original Italian text of the amendment stated:
L'annullamento di una legge ordinaria invalida da parte della Corte
costituzionale avrA efficacia oggettiva e potrA, inoltre, essere promosso in via
principale dal Governo, da cinquanta deputati, da un Consiglio regionale, da
non meno di diecimila elettori, o da qualsiasi cittadino che dimostri di avervi
interesse per la lesione di un suo diritto o interesse costituzionalmente
garantito.(emphasis added)
170. In original: "11 ricorso per illegittimitA costituzionale pub essere prodotto
direttamente innanzi alla Corte costituzionale nel termine che sarA fissato dalla legge, da
chi pretenda direttamente leso dalla norma un suo diritto o interesse legittimo. . . ."
Reference to the ICC was also made on December 3, 1947, by Francesco Domined6 in
the debate over the proposed text of Article 137 of the Constitution. Remarks of
Francesco Domined6, DEB. (Dec. 3, 1947).
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The Constituent Assembly eventually decided to leave the
determination of the "conditions, forms and terms for proposing
judgments on constitutional legitimacy""' to a subsequent constitutional
law, without excluding the possibility of introducing the ICC. Openness
to reception of the ICC is also evident in the fact that the Editorial
Committee of the Constituent Assembly, in addition to the text submitted
to and finally adopted by the Assembly, drafted a tentative text of Article
137 of the Constitution including a provision introducing the ICC, in
case the Assembly had decided to vote on its establishment.17 2
When the implementing law was enacted in 1948, no reference was
made to the ICC, which therefore remained excluded from the
circumstances granting access to the Court. 173
According to some commentators, 7 4 had the ICC been introduced
in 1947-1948, allowing an individual to challenge decisions issued by
courts, the jurisprudence of the highest ordinary and administrative
courts would have been influenced by the values and principles
embodied in the new Italian Constitution and made consistent with them
in a more timely fashion.
Since 1947-1948, proposals for introduction of a system of
individual constitutional complaint have recurred.1 75 Generally, there
171. Art. 137 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
172. In regards to the part of the article addressing the ICC, it stated that, "[t]he
citizen or the body which claims a direct and current harm to a right or to a legitimate
interest can lodge directly with the Court an issue of constitutionality." The full Italian
text of Article 137 of the Constitution, in the version including the ICC, stated
[I]a questione di legittimith costituzionale, che nel corso d'un giudizio sia
rilevata d'ufficio o sollevata da una delle parti e non ritenute dal giudice
manifestamente infondata, 6 rimessa alla Corte costituzionale per la sua
decisione. Il cittadino o I'ente che ritenga leso in modo diretto ed attuale un
suo diritto o interesse legittimo puo promuovere direttamente il giudizio di
legittimithi costituzionale davanti alla Corte. Tale giudizio pu6 essere altresi
promosso, nell'interesse generale, dal Governo o da un quinto dei
componenti d'una Camera o da tre Consigli regionali" (emphasis added).
See Meuccio Ruini, President, Committee for the Constitution, Statement Regarding
Article 137 of the Constitution (Dec. 22, 1947).
173. See also CARLO MEZZANOTTE, IL GIUDIZIO SULLE LEGGI, supranote 165.
174. See ELISABETTA CRIVELLI, LA TUTELA DEl DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI E LACCESSO
ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE [PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] 12 (2003) (It.). The author explicitly cites the Post-Franco

Spain and Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War, where-in the author's
perspective-the individual constitutional complaint helped making the citizens more
aware of the new rights entrenched in the Constitution and the transition to a whole new
constitutional system. Id.
175. See also Angelo Scavone, Appunti sulle proposte di introduzione del ricorso
costituzionale diretto in Italia [Notes on the proposals of introduction of the individual
constitutionalcomplaint in Italy] RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITFO E PROCEDURA CIVILE
1241 (1981) (It.). Carlo Mezzanotte, II problema della fungibiliti tra eccezione di
incostituzionaliti e ricorso diretto alla Corte costituzionale [The problem offungibility
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have been two main reasons weighing in support of its adoption: first,
the need to provide a more comprehensive system for the protection of
fundamental rights; second, the need to correct some of the shortcomings
that have supposedly arisen in the application of the incidenter control of
constitutionality.17 6 Before the establishment of the Constitutional Court
in 1956, a proposal for the introduction of a system of individual
constitutional complaint was first presented by Mauro Cappelletti.1 77
Another proposal in support of the introduction of a system of individual
constitutional complaint was later presented by several Italian
constitutional-law scholars in a roundtable held in Florence on December
9-10, 1965. ' That same year, a draft constitutional amendment was
introduced into the Parliament on December 15.179 Despite arousing the
interest and partial support of constitutional scholars and practitioners,
these proposals were not pursued and, as a result, were eventually
abandoned.
Scholars have long since recognized that the incidenter control of
constitutionality represents an adequate means to protect the fundamental
rights of the citizens. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, in the past
twenty years, has increasingly interpreted the rules regulating the
procedure before the Court and the provisions of the Constitution in light
between the issue of constitutionality and the individual complaint before the
ConstitutionalCourt] GIUSTIZIA ECOSTITUZIONE 77 (1997) (It.).
176. Id.
177. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, LA GIURISDIZIONE COSTITUZIONALE DELLE LIBERTA [THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION ON FREEDOMS] (1955) (It.).
178. It was on this occasion that Italian constitutional scholars underlined for the first
time the existence of so-called "grey areas" (i.e., normative acts not challengeable for
constitutionality before the Court) in the protection provided by the Constitutional Court
against unconstitutional acts of the State.
See LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE
[CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE] (Giuseppe Maranini ed., 1966) (proceedings of the roundtable
with Italian constitutional scholars). See also Paolo Carrozza, Roberto Romboli &
Emanuele Rossi, I limiti all'accesso al giudizio sulle leggi e le prospettive per il loro
superamento [Limits in the access to judicial review of legislation and perspectives on
their overcoming], in L'ACCESSO ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE: CARATrERI, LIMITI,
PROSPETTIVE DI UN MODELLO 679 (Roberto Romboli ed., 2006); see also Aldo Sandulli,
RAPPORTI TRA GIUSTIZIA COMUNE E GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE IN ITALIA [ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORDINARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN ITALY] (1968).

Participants in the roundtable drafted a constitutional amendment for the introduction of a
system granting direct access to the Constitutional Court not to mere individuals but,
conversely, to a certain number of citizens (so-called "popular action"): "all citizens,
within one year from the entry into force of a law or an act with the force of law, can
challenge it directly before the Constitutional Court": UGO SPAGNOLI, I PROBLEMI DELLA
CORTE. APPUNTI DI GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 104 (1996).
179. Draft Constitutional law no. 2870, introduced into the Italian Chamber of Deputy
on December 15, 1965. The constitutional law, if approved, would have allowed direct
recourse to the Constitutional Court against decisions of the highest ordinary and
administrative Courts (Court of Cassation and Council of State) in case of incorrect
application of constitutional provisions.
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of the Court's purpose to broaden protection of fundamental rights. The
Court itself and constitutional-law scholars, however, have come to
realize that in some circumstances the protection provided through this
mechanism may not be complete. This recognition has led some
citizens, in several circumstances, to set up so-called lites fictae
(fictitious cases) before an ordinary court in order to have access to the
Constitutional Court and have their rights protected from an
unconstitutional law.'so Indeed, the introduction of the ICC in the Italian
legal system has always been intended to supplement-rather than
substitute for-the . extant system of incidenter control of
constitutionality, in order to address its shortcomings.
Subsequent initiatives aimed at introducing an individual
constitutional complaint are worth mentioning. 8' In 1989, a proposal for
an amendment to the Italian Constitution was introduced into the
Parliament.182 The proposed amendment would have introduced the
possibility for a citizen to apply directly to the Constitutional Court to
challenge laws, acts with the force of law, judicial decisions, and acts
issued by the public administration whenever a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution had been violated.' 8 3 The same year, a
seminar was also organized at the Constitutional Court to address the
possibility of adopting a system of individual constitutional complaint.184
During the XII Legislature of the Italian Parliament (April 1994May 1996), a Studying Committee for the Institutional, Electoral and
Constitutional Reforms was set up by then-President of the Council of
Ministers, Silvio Berlusconi.'15 The Committee drafted a project aimed
at increasing the competences of the Constitutional Court, including the
possibility of judging on "recourses presented by anyone claiming to
have been harmed by an act of the public authority in one of the
inviolable rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution.",

180.

See generally ELISABETTA CRIVELLI, LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI,

supranote 174.
181. The following projects have been presented before the establishment of the
Bicameral Commission for Constitutional Reforms in the XIII Legislature whose role and
functions will be detailed further in the text.
182. See Records of the Italian Parliament (Atti Parlamentari),Chamber of Deputies,
n. 4168, Aug. 3, 1989, signatories And6, Cappiello, et al.
183. Id.
184. The seminar was held on November 13-14, 1989. The proceedings have been
published in AA.VV., GIUDIZIO "A QUO" E PROMUOVIMENTO DEL PROCESSO
COSTITUZIONALE ["A QUO" JUDGMENT AND PROCEDURES TO ACTIVATE A CONSTITUTIONAL
RECOURSE] (Giuffr , 1990).
185. The Studying Committee was established by President of the Council of
Ministers Decree of July 14, 1994.
186. The final report of the Committee, presented on December 21, 1994, was
published by the Department for Constitutional Reform under the Presidency of the
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The text of the proposed amendment went on, stating:
Recourses are admissible only after exhaustion of all remedies of the
However, the
ordinary and administrative jurisdictions.
Constitutional Court can nonetheless judge upon those constitutional
recourses already lodged and deemed to be of an important and
general interest or when serious, immediate and irreparable harm can
be suffered by the applicant due to the time reauired to receive
protection from ordinary and administrative courts.
Despite initial consideration, none of these attempts proved, in the
end, successful.
C.

1997: The ParliamentaryCommissionfor ConstitutionalReforms
and the Revision of the Italian Constitution

In 1997, a new Congress on the subject was organized in Ferrara, on
the occasion of the celebration for the 200 years since the establishment
of the first Constitutional Law chair in Europe at the University of
Ferrara.188
Also in 1997, the newly established Parliamentary Commission for
Constitutional Reform ("Commissione Parlamentare per le Riforme
Costituzionali") preliminarily approved the project for a comprehensive
reform of the Italian Constitution drafted within the XIII Legislature of
the Italian Parliament (May 9, 1996-May 29, 2001)."9 This project
deserves more detailed consideration.

Council of Ministers in 1995. An account of the Committee's aims and of the content of
its final report can be found at http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/dossier/
prec08.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
187. Id.
188. IL DIRITFO COSTITUZIONALE A DUECENTO ANNI DALLA PRIMA CATTEDRA IN EUROPA
("CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AFTER 200 YEARS FROM THE FIRST CHAIR IN EUROPE") (Lorenza
Carlassare ed., 1998). The first chair in Constitutional Law in Europe was established at
the University of Ferrara in 1797. The Congress was held on May 2-3, 1997); see also
Valerio Onida, La Corte e i diritti: tutela dei dirittifondamentalie accesso alla giustizia
costituzionale [The Court and rights: protection of fundamental rights and access to
constitutionaljustice], in STUDI IN ONORE DI LEOPOLDO ELIA-TOMO 2 (Giuffrd Editore
ed., 1999). During the Congress, then-Constitutional Court Judge Valerio Onida
expressed the opinion that the introduction of a system of direct access to the Court for
appeal of judicial decisions violating fundamental constitutional rights would have been
desirable. The majority of the other participants, however, expressed a more cautious
stance on the advisability of introducing such a system, especially for fear of developing
a conflicting relationship between the Constitutional Court and ordinary judges.
189. Legge Costituzionale 24 gennaio 1997, n. I (It.) (The Bicameral Commission
was established with Constitutional Law no. 1/1997 titled "Establishment of a
available at
Reforms"),
Constitutional
for
Commission
Parliamentary
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/ifcost/legist/legge.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
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The Commission, also referred to as the "Bicameral Commission,"
was composed of thirty-five members of the Chamber of Deputies and
thirty-five members of the Senate, appointed by the Presidents of the two
Houses of Parliament.190 The Bicameral Commission started its activity
in February 1997 with the purpose of drafting a comprehensive reform of
the Second Part of the Italian Constitution.' 9 '
Even though the project drafted by the Commission was eventually
rejected by the Parliament and never came into effect, it nonetheless
represents, to date, the most comprehensive attempt to revise the Second
Part of the Italian Constitution, introducing-among other institutions-a
system of individual constitutional complaint in the Italian legal system.
The projected revision of the Constitution, in the part addressing the
Constitutional Court, aimed at increasing its competences and functions,
introducing new circumstances providing for the possibility of lodging
an application with the Constitutional Court.192 Among those new
competences, the new text of Article 134193 would have been amended in
order to include, under letter g), the power to judge on "recourses lodged
with the Court in order to protect, against all public powers, fundamental

190. See id.
19 1. Id.
192. The project would have modified articles 59, 134, and 137 of the Constitution of
the Italian Republic.
193. The final draft of the proposed new art. 134, approved by the Bicameral
Commission, read as follows:
The Constitutional Court shall pass judgments on:
Controversies on the constitutional legitimacy of laws and
enactments having force of law issued by the State and Regions;
Controversies on the constitutional legitimacy of regulations, in cases
established by the Constitution;
Conflicts arising from allocation of powers between powers of the
State; conflicts arising from allocation of powers to State and
Regions and between Regions, Provinces and Municipalities;
Charges brought against the President of the Republic, according to
the Constitution;
Claims filed with regard to the elections of the President of the
Republic;
Admissibility of abrogative referenda.
Recourses lodged with the Court in order to protect, against all
public powers, fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution,
according to the conditions, forms and prescriptive periods to be
establishedby constitutionallaw.
(Original Italian wording of letter g): "sui ricorsi per la tutela, nei confronti dei
pubblici poteri, dei diritti fondamentali garantiti dalla Costituzione, secondo
condizioni, forme e termini di proponibilitA stabiliti con legge costituzionale."
COMMISSIONE PARLAMENTARE PER LE RIFORME COSTITUZIONALI, PROGETFO DI LEGGE
at
available
(1997),
COSTITUZIONALE

http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel7.htm
2011).

(last visited Apr. 1,
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rights guaranteed by the Constitution, according to the conditions, forms
and prescriptive periods to be established by constitutional law."
The Report on the System of Guarantees, 194 drafted within the
Commission by Marco Boato, explicitly identifies the reasons for the
introduction of the individual constitutional complaint for the purpose of
supplementing the protection of fundamental rights already provided
through the "incidenter" system of judicial review, in order to cover all
of the circumstances not protected by existing competences of the Court.
The Report also shows that the members of the Commission were aware
of the application that this mechanism had found in several foreign
experiences,1 95 as well as the increased workload for foreign
constitutional courts deriving from its adoption. Despite this significant
disadvantage, however, the ICC system was deemed worth introducing.
In the Commission's view, the complaint should have been designed as
an exceptional means of protection for fundamental rights and should
have avoided compromising the Court's functionality. This latter aim
would have been achieved through the establishment of clear
requirements for citizens to be granted the possibility to apply. On the
other hand, the purpose of the Commission was to achieve a protection
as broad as possible for those fundamental rights' 96 entrenched in the
Constitution, making them protectable before the Constitutional Court
even in the absence of a controversy. The Report was eventually sent to
the Parliament along with the final draft of the proposed amendment.
194. COMMISSIONE PARLAMENTARE PER LE RIFORME COSTITUZIONALI, RELAZIONE SUL
SISTEMA DELLE GARANZIE DEL DEPUTATO MARCO BOATO (Parliamentary Committee on

Constitutional Reform, Report on the system of warranties Member of Marco Boato)
(2008), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel6.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
195. Id. In the Report, express reference was made to the Spanish recurso de
amparo, the German verfassungsbeschwerde, and the Austrian individualbeschwerde or
individualantrag. All three models were analyzed and considered in detail; specifically
highlighted were the differences with regard to the acts that could be reviewed for their
constitutionality.
196. Generally recognized as those listed in Articles 1-11 of the Italian Constitution.
However, the category of "fundamental rights" is far from being unanimously recognized
in its content and has been variously defined by the doctrine. See, e.g., Alessandro Pace,
Diritti fondamentali al di la della Costituzione [Fundamental Rights beyond the
Constitution], in POLITICA DEL DIRITTo 3 (1993). Some scholars have sustained a perfect
coincidence between the category of "fundamental right" and those listed in the
Constitution; but see Antonio Baldassare, Diritti Inviolabili [Inviolable Rights], in
ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 18 (Vol. 11, 1989). Some others have stated that the two
categories should be kept separated, the category of "fundamental rights" being, on one
hand, narrower than that of the rights entrenched in the Italian Constitution, and at the
same time, on the other hand, wider, including some rights which are only implicitly
considered by the Constitution. For a detailed account of these theories, see Antonino
Spadaro II problema del <<fondamento>>dei diritti <<fondamentali [The problem of the
'foundative" element of 'fundamental" rights], I DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI OGGI 64 (1995).
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Throughout the drafting process, constitutional scholars provided
reflections and comments on the different options available and the
choices made by the Commission. When the Commission approved the
project, and the final text was ready to be introduced into the Parliament
for final approval, criticism was expressed with regard to several of the

choices made.19 7
While the project acknowledged the residual character of the
individual constitutional complaint in the protection of fundamental
rights, it eventually opted for adoption of a system of individual
constitutional complaint with quite broad admissibility criteria. Indeed,
according to the proposed new text of Article 134 Const., the complaint
could have been proposed against any act issued by a public power,
including judicial decisions. Moreover, in the final draft, the reference to
the necessary previous exhaustion of judicial remedies, present in earlier
drafts, was omitted. The Report itself underlines how the final draft of
the proposed amendment significantly differed from the first, which
stated:
The Constitutional Court shall pass judgment: ...

g) On complaints lodged by anyone claiming a harm to one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution inflicted by an act
of a Public Power, in case no other judicial remedy is provided.198
This first draft was clear in providing access to the Court only when
a subject could not access any other jurisdictional remedy. The
Committee first rephrased the final part of the article, requiring the
previous exhaustion of judicial remedies, eventually omitting any such
reference.' 99
The legitimacy and opportunity to leave to a subsequent
constitutional law the identification of those fundamental rights whose
infringement could have been claimed by an individual was also
significantly debated. The explanatory Report suggested that the

197. See Livio Paladin, Corte costituzionale: aumentano le funzioni ma ii future
potrebbeportare la paralisi[Constitutional Courts: the functions are increased,and the
future could bring about a paralysis], GUIDA AL DIRITo, no. 43, 65 (1997). See also
Michele Carducci, Ipotesi di accesso diretto alla Corte costituzionale [Hypotheses of
direct access to the ConstitutionalCourt], 2 QUADERNI COST. 315 (1998).
198. The original text of the first draft, in Italian, provided: "ricorsi presentati da
chiunque ritenga di essere stato leso in uno dei diritti fondamentali garantiti dalla
Costituzione da un atto dei pubblici poteri avverso il quale non sia dato rimedio
giurisdizionale."
199. See Relazione Sul Sistema Delle Garanzie del Deputato Marco Boato,
http://www.camera.it/parlam/bicam/rifcost/docapp/rel6.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011)
(It.).
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Constitutional Court be given some leeway in determining the category
of "fundamental rights" at issue, but this aspect was already marking a
clear difference between the Italian project and, for instance, the Spanish
experience, where the Constitution directly identifies the rights protected
under the recurso de amparo.2 00
Finally, the new provision referenced neither the acts that could be
challenged nor the criteria to be applied by the Court in selecting
applications. The indeterminacy of the provision led some commentators
to state that the project, far from leaving to a subsequent constitutional
law the mere implementation of an already defined mechanism, left to
that law the definition of the very core features of the constitutional
complaint.20 '
As previously noted, the project was not adopted by the Parliament
and was eventually abandoned.20 2
Additional structured proposals for the introduction of a system of
individual constitutional complaint have not been advanced since 1997,
but the issue was raised again in 1999 in a Conference organized in
Florence2 0 3 and has been addressed periodically by various Presidents of
the Italian Constitutional Court in their annual press conferences.2 04
D.

IncidenterReview: An Already Effective System?

Recurrently over the past twenty years, several constitutional-law
scholars have expressed the idea that a more comprehensive and efficient

200. Id.
201. See e.g., Saulle Panizza, I ricorso diretto dei singoli [The direct recourse of
individuals], in PROSPETrIVE DI ACCESSO ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE (ATTI DEL
CONVEGNO DI FIRENZE DEL 28-29 MAGGIO 1999) [PERSPECTIVES ON ACCESS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE (PROCEEDINGS OF THE FLORENCE CONGRESS OF 28-29 MAY
1999)] 81 (Adele Anzon, Paolo Caretti & Stefano Grassi eds., 2000).
202. See Riforme, la fine della Bicamerale [ConstitutionalReforms: the end of the
BicameralCommission], CORRIERE DELLA SERA, June 3, 1998.
203. PROSPETTIVE DI ACCESSO ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE [PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ACCESS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] (Adele Anzon, Paolo Caretti & Stefano Grassi
eds., 2000). The Congress was organized by the so-called "Gruppo di Pisa" and held in
Florence on May 28-29, 1999.
204. See La giustizia costituzionale nel 1997 [Constitutionaljustice in 1997], FORO
ITALIANO, Feb. 11, 1998, 133: transcript of the annual press conference of the President
of the Constitutional Court, Judge Renato Granata. See also Annual press conference of

the President of the Constitutional Court, Judge Valerio Onida, Jan. 20, 2005, available
at www.cortecostituzionale.it (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). See also Paolo Passaglia,
Sull'inopportunitadi introdurreil ricorso diretto individuale: qualche riflessione (ed una
provocazione) [On the inopportunity to introduce an individual direct recourse: some
reflections
and
a
provocative
statement],
available
at
http://joomla.ddp.unipi.it/documenti/persdoc/contributilRicorso diretto individuale.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011), offering reflections on the (in)opportunity to adopt a system of
ICC in Italy after consideration and comparison of the statements of the two Presidents.
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protection of fundamental rights in Italy can be achieved with the
introduction of a system of individual constitutional complaint in one of
its various forms, to supplement and enhance the protection of
fundamental rights already in existence.20 5 The recurring interest in the
establishment of this type of recourse to the Constitutional Court can be
explained with the desire of legal scholars and practitioners to achieve
protection for those legal situations and areas of law that are not already
covered by the incidenter control of constitutionality. 20 6 It is worth
asking, however, if-and to what degree-introduction of an individual
constitutional complaint into the system would be really useful in
overcoming some of the supposed shortcomings and the so-called "grey
areas" of the Italian system of judicial review.
Often included amongst these shortcomings is the impossibility for
the Italian Constitutional Court to judge the constitutionality of
secondary sources (e.g. regulations), administrative acts and judicial
decisions, and the supposed untimely protection that the "incidenter"
review would grant when law-decrees or election laws would be
involved.2 0 7 However, it is this author's opinion that the introduction of
a system of individual constitutional complaint offers uncertain
advantages and some clear risks. The protection of fundamental rights
should, therefore, preferably be addressed by ordinary courts, and a
system of individual constitutional complaint-if introduced-should be
designed in order to become a merely residual recourse providing
citizens an additional avenue to access the Court for protection of "rights
or interests" from an unconstitutional encroachment originating from
public powers.
Consistent with this approach, the Italian Constitutional Court,
through its jurisprudence, has tried to develop all the potentialities of the
"incidenter" system of judicial review to provide a broad and
comprehensive protection of fundamental rights. One of the mechanisms
the Court has used to enhance rights protection has been a progressive
interpretation of the rules regulating third-party intervention in the
hearings before the Constitutional Court, thus overruling its own
205. See MAURO CAPPELLETTl, LA GIURISDIZIONE COSTITUZIONALE DELLE LIBERTA,
supra note, 177. See also Valerio Onida, La Corte e i diritti,supra note 188. See also
Adele Anzon, Per una ph ampia garanzia dei diritticostituzionalidinanzi alla Corte: il
ricorso individuale diretto [For a broaderprotection of constitutionalrights before the
Court: direct individual recourse], in LIBERTA E GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE
[LIBERTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE] (Vittorio Angiolini ed., 1992).
206. See generally, LE ZONE D'OMBRA DELLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE. I GIUDIZI
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
SULLE LEGGI [GREY AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE.
LEGISLATION], (Renato Balduzzi & Pasquale Costanzo eds., 2007).
207. See ELISABETTA CRIVELLI, LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI, supra note

174, at 18.
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previous strict interpretation, which had categorically excluded any thirdparty intervention.208 This broader interpretation has spurred a shift from
a so called "objective interest" in the judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation (i.e. a general interest of the whole legal
system in the constitutionality of legislation), to a more "subjective" one
(i.e. a specific interest in the protection of the subjective fundamental
rights at stake in the decision on the constitutionality of legislation).
According to some authors, with this shift, the Court has increasingly
become "a rights Court."209
Moreover, the Court has also used its power to decide on the
"relevant" and "not manifestly unfounded" character of the question of
constitutionality raised by the ad hoc judge, in order to move toward a
"more decentralized system" of judicial review of legislation. 2 10 Indeed,
the Constitutional Court has repeatedly urged ordinary judges to directly
further an "adapting interpretation" (interpretazioneadeguatrice),that is,
to directly solve an issue of constitutionality of legislation without
raising a question before the Constitutional Court when-among the
many possible scenarios-a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the
applicable law is available.2 1 1 While this practice brings with it the risk
that ordinary judges will avoid referring questions of constitutional
legitimacy to the Constitutional Court, even in cases when this would be
necessary, it also has the advantage of determining a more concrete (i.e.
closer to the facts of the case) and more tailored analysis of the
constitutionality of the legislation which eventually results in a decision
with only interpartes effect. Conversely, decisions of the Constitutional
Court that declare the unconstitutionality of a statute have erga omnes
effect. The protection of fundamental rights in this case is therefore also
enhanced.
The "incidenter" system of judicial review also leaves certain types
of laws outside the protection provided by the Constitutional Court. The
system is deemed to be inadequate, for example, to evaluate the
constitutional legitimacy of laws whose alleged unconstitutionality

208. See Corte cost., decisions no. 20/1982, no. 421/1991, nos. 314 and 315/1992 and
no. 176/1996.
209. VALERIO ONIDA, & MARILISA D'AMico, IL GIUDIZIO DI COSTITUZIONALITA DELLE
LEGGI, MATERIALI DI DIRITFO COSTITUZIONALE, VOL. I, IL GIUDIZIO IN VIA INCIDENTALE
[JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION. MATERIALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, VOL. I,
INCIDENTER REVIEW] 247 (1997).

210. See Mauro Cappelletti, Questioni nuove (e vecchie) sullagiustizia costituzionale
[New (andold) views on constitutionaljustice], in GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 857
(1990).
211. See generally Corte cost. decisions nos. 347/1998, 349/1998, 418/1998,
450/1998, 283/1999 and 436/1999.
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should be assessed timely and without delay. 2 12 Until recently, this was
the case, for example, of those acts with the force of law adopted by the
Government according to the procedure established by Article 77 of the
Italian Constitution (so called decrees-law).213 According to the original
stance of the Constitutional Court, the constitutionality of these acts with
specific regard to the existence of the requirements of urgency and
necessity for their adoption could no longer be assessed after they had
been converted into law by the Parliament (conversion must take place
214
within sixty days of enactment).
Only in 1995 did the Court, realizing
the gap that its own jurisprudence had created, overruled its previous
decisions and affirmed its competence to judge the constitutionality of
already converted decrees-law (together with the converting Law) with
regard to the necessity and urgency requirements that justified the

measure.215
Other problems are usually deemed to arise with regard to those
laws-fundamental for the functioning of the whole democratic
system-whose first application could take place well before a question
of constitutionality could be referred to and resolved by the
Constitutional Court, for example, election laws.216
With regard to the category of acts that the Court can scrutinize for
consistency with the Constitution, article 134 Const., as interpreted by
the Constitutional Court, precludes the Court from considering the
212. See ELISABETTA CRIVELLI, LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI, supra note
174, at 47.
213. See Republic of Italy Cost. art. 77, which states that:
The Government may not, without delegation from the Houses, issue decrees
having the force of law. When in extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency
the Government adopts under its own responsibility provisional measures
having the force of law, it must on the same day present them for conversion
into law to the Houses that, even if dissolved, shall be especially summoned
and shall be assembled within five days. The decrees lose effect from their
inception if they are not converted into law within sixty days from their
publication. The Houses can however regulate through laws the legal relations
arising out of decrees not converted.
214. See generally Corte cost. Decision no. 108/1986.
215. The Constitutional Court overruled its previous case law to affirm its
competence to judge on already converter law-decrees in decision no. 29/1995. For an
account of the development of the Court's jurisprudence on the constitutionality of
decree-laws see Roberto Romboli, Decreto-legge e giurisprudenza della Corte
costituzionale [Decree-law and Constitutional Jurisprudence], in L'EMERGENZA INFINITA.
LA DECRETAZIONE D'URGENZA IN ITALIA 107 (Andrea Simoncini ed., 2006).

216. See CRIVELLI, supra note 174, at 47. With regard to election laws, the author
recalls how, back in 1956, Piero Calamandrei had already highlighted the possible
shortcoming of the incidenter system ofjudicial review, especially with regard to election
laws infringing upon the principle of equal suffrage or that modify, in violation of the
Constitution, the age for franchise and eligibility: see Piero Calamandrei, Corte
costituzionale e autoritagiudiziaria[The Constitutional Court and the Judicial Power],
in RiVISTA DI DIRITFO PROCESSUALE 16 (1956).
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constitutionality of secondary sources, such as regulations. 217 The Court
has consistently stated that it is allowed to review the constitutionality of
only primary sources of law, that is, statutory laws and acts with the
force of law (namely, decrees-law and legislative decrees). Secondary
sources, however, and more specifically regulations, in many cases
represent the only source of law regulating a whole area of human
activities as a consequence of recurring efforts of delegification, 2 18 and
cannot, therefore, be scrutinized either by the Constitutional Court or by
ordinary judges for consistency with a law or with an act having the
force of law, since these latter are missing. In all those cases,
introduction of the possibility for an individual to apply directly to the
Constitutional Court would provide protection to rights otherwise left
without guarantees.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ADVISABILITY TO ADOPT THE

INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT INITALY
While adoption of the individual constitutional complaint in new
democracies may enhance legitimacy and acceptance of a newly
established constitutional or supreme court in the system, it is this
author's view that different considerations should apply with regard to a
system of judicial review-as the Italian-that has already achieved full
legitimacy, acceptance and support in a legal system and that has also
developed a considerable line of decisions. In this latter case, only a
truly compelling need to address important "grey areas" in the
protections of fundamental rights should mandate adoption of a system
of direct access to the Constitutional Court. The debate on the
introduction of the individual constitutional complaint in the Italian legal
system is, therefore, deeply linked to the achieved effectiveness of the
already existing system of "incidenter" and concrete judicial review of
legislation chosen by the Constituent Assembly and as further developed
by the Constitutional Court over the past years of activity.
In Italy, the impossibility of directly resorting to the Constitutional
Court for protection of constitutional rights has led, over time, to the
enhancement of the "incidenter" review of legislation as a way to protect
fundamental rights and to the development of this type of review in

217. See Corte Cost. no. 23/1989 and no. 456/1994.
218. Through processes of "delegification" the Parliament authorizes administrative
authorities to adopt regulations in areas previously governed by statutory law, for
efficiency purposes. For a treatment of this phenomenon, in connection with access to
the Constitutional Court, see Tommaso Giovannetti, Delegificazione, regolamenti e atti
amministrativi [Delegification, regulations, and administrative acts], in L'ACCESSO ALLA
GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE 467 (Roberto Romboli ed., 2006).
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original ways. Ordinary judges are seen as the "door keepers" 219 of the
Court, in a "bottom-up" process activated through the "incidenter"
review. The role that the Italian Constitutional Court has played in the
system has relied on and has been directly proportional to the sensitivity
of ordinary judges with regard to issues like the protection of
fundamental rights and the implementation of the principles entrenched
in the Constitution. Indeed, as we have seen, it is up to ordinary and
administrative judges to decide when-and if-to raise an issue of
constitutionality of a law before the Constitutional Court when some
prerequisites ("non manifesta infondatezza" e "rilevanza") are present.
The Constitutional Court, in the past years, however, through its
case law, has reversed this process, making it a "top-down" one. The
Court has recognized that all judges have an important role, not only in
applying its decisions, but also, and more importantly, in directly
conducting a limited control of the constitutionality of statutory laws
(including those affecting fundamental rights), with the only limit
represented by the impossibility for ordinary judges to refuse to apply
directly (i.e. without first resorting to the Constitutional Court) those
laws they considered unconstitutional (a role that is still reserved
exclusively to the Constitutional Court).2 20
Increasingly often, the Constitutional Court has declared
inadmissible the questions of constitutional legitimacy presented and has
asked ad hoc judges to directly provide a "constitutionally oriented"
interpretation of the challenged statutory law.221 Before referring a
question to the Constitutional Court, an ordinary judge is now expected
to look for an interpretation of the statute at issue that would preserve its
constitutional validity 222 and show-together with the two
abovementioned requirements-that a constitutionally adequate

219. The expression was originally created by Piero Calamandrei.
220. It is worth remembering, though, that ordinary judges already disapply-in Italy
as in all the other member States of the European Union-statutory laws which they
deem are inconsistent with European Union law, probably furthering the general level of
decentralization of the system.
221. See, e.g., Corte Cost. no. 356/1990: "in principle, laws are not declared
unconstitutional when it is theoretically possible to interpret them in unconstitutional
ways, but when it is impossible to interpret them in a way which is consistent with the
Constitution." See also Corte Cost. nos. 347/1998, 349/1998, 418/1998, 450/1998,
283/1999 and 436/1999.
222. While in Spain this is explicitly required by art. 5.3 of the Ley Organica del
Poder Judicial (1985), the Constitutional Court of Italy developed this requirement
through case law: see Corte Cost. no. 356/1990. See Tania Groppi, The Italian
Constitutional Court: Towards a 'Multilevel System' of Constitutional Review? 2 J.
COMP. L. 100, 116 (2008).
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interpretation is impossible.223 As a consequence of this evolution, the
protection of constitutional rights against unconstitutional legislation is
enhanced and can be addressed before ordinary judges.
This "virtuous nexus" between the Constitutional Court and
ordinary courts has dispelled the original distrust towards ordinary
judges that characterized the early years following the enactment of the
1948 Constitution and that represented the main reason for the adoption
of a centralized system of judicial review. 224 It is this author's view that
the introduction of a system of direct constitutional recourse, especially
in cases in which a decision issued by ordinary or administrative judges
could be challenged directly before the Constitutional Court, would run
the risk of breaking this "virtuous nexus," implicitly accusing ordinary
judges of providing an ineffective protection of rights. This is the reason
why, while some Italian scholars support the introduction of a broad ICC
system,225 others-whose opinion we share-look favorably at the
introduction of a constitutional complaint on condition that judicial
decisions cannot be challenged.22 6
On a different note, it is this author's opinion that the advisability
(or lack thereof) of the introduction of the ICC in Italy should also be
223. Tania Groppi, Corte costituzionale e principio di effettiviti [The Constitutional
Court and the Principleof Effectiveness], 1 RASSEGNA PARLAMENTARE 189, 213 (2004).
See, e.g., Corte Cost. no. 343/2006: "the ad hoc judge ... has the duty to choose, among
the several possible interpretations of a provision, the one which can dispel doubts of

constitutional illegitimacy, raising an issue of constitutionality only when the text of the
provision precludes any possibility to interpret it in a constitutionally-oriented way."
224. See Elisabetta Lamarque, Interpreting Statutes in Conformity with the
Constitution: The Role of the Constitutional Court and OrdinaryJudges, 1 IT.J. PUB. L.
91, 105 (2010), quoting Piero Calamandrei, Corte Costituzionalee autoritagiudiziaria,I
Riv. DIR. PROC. 8, 9 & 53 (1956) (discussing on the importance of an "active
collaboration" between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary judges "working
together like two complementary and inseparable gears of a single procedural
mechanism" for the correct functioning of constitutional review in Italy), available at
http://www.ijpl.eu/assets/files/pdf/2010_volumeI/IJPL%20volume%201 2010.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
225. See Adele Anzon, Per una pii ampia garanzia dei diritti costituzionali[For a
broaderprotection ofconstitutionalrights], supra note 205, at 24.
226. See Romboli R., Ampliamento dell'accesso alla Corte costituzionale e
introduzione di un ricorso diretto a tutela dei dirittifondamentali [Enlargement of the
access to the ConstitutionalCourt and adoption of an individual complaint to protect
fundamental rights], in PROSPETTIVE DI ACCESSO ALLA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE (Arn
DEL CONVEGNO DI FIRENZE DEL 28-29 MAGGIO 1999) [PERSPECTIVES ON ACCESS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE (PROCEEDINGS OF THE FLORENCE CONGRESS OF 28-29 MAY

1999)] 81 (Adele Anzon, Paolo Caretti & Stefano Grassi eds., 2000); "Torniamo alla
Costituente": considerazioniin ordine all'introduzionedi un ricorsodiretto del singolo e
delle minoranze parlamentarialla Corte costituzionale ["Going back to the Constituent
Assembly": reflections on the Introduction of a direct appeal for individuals and
parliamentary minorities to the Constitutional Court], in 43 RIPE-REVISTA DO
INSTITUTO DE PESQUISAS E ESTUDOS, BAURU 31 (2008).
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assessed in light of the possibility for an individual to receive
supranational protection of rights by applying to the European Court of
Human Rights for violation of the rights entrenched in the Convention; 227
or the possibility-since 2007-to directly claim infringement of rights
protected by the European Convention on Human Rights before Italian
ordinary and administrative judges. Indeed, with regard to this latter
development, the Constitutional Court, in four pivotal decisions,228 in
light of the amended text of article 117 of the Constitution, 229 has
recognized infra-constitutional status to the ECHR, defining it as "norma
interposta."230 As a consequence of this achieved status, the Convention
is now directly applicable in the Italian legal system and is now part of
the Constitutional Court's parameter for constitutional review of
domestic legislation.231
It is beyond doubt that the ICC has the capacity to highly affect the
system of judicial review adopted in a country, especially considering its
227. According to the individual application procedure set up in article 34 of the
Convention. On this topic, see Cappelletti, supra, note 210, at 32, where the author
expresses the view that, in light of Italy's participation in the system of the European
Convention of Human Rights, the introduction of a national individual constitutional
complaint would be, under many aspects, redundant. See also CRIVELLI, supra note 174,
at 150.
228. See Corte cost. decisions nos. 348 and 349/2007; Corte cost. decisions nos. 311
and 317/2009 (decisions are available, in English, on the website of the Italian
Constitutional Court: http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ActionPagina 325.do (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011). See also Gianluca Gentili, The status of the ECHR in the Italianhierarchy
of sources as determined by the Italian Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court
decisions ns. 348, 349/2007), PALOMAR, available at http://www.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/
italyool 2008.html#3 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); Gianluca Gentili, The Italian
Constitutional Court and the legal status of the European Convention on Human Rights
in the national legal system: positive competition between fundamental rights provisions
(Constitutional Court decisions ns. 311, 317/2009), PALOMAR, available at
http://www.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/italy009_2010.html#5 (last visited Jan. 1, 2011).
229. Art. 117, cl. 1 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.), indicating that "Legislative powers shall
be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and with the
constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations" (emphasis
provided), with the ECHR being considered by the Court in decisions 348 and 349/2007
as falling within the latter type of constraints.
230. Meaning that the Convention now has supremacy over legislative materials but
remains subordinate to the Constitution in the Italian hierarchy of sources of law.
231. However, as highlighted by Philipp Cede:
the ECHR's status does not reach the same level as [EU] law: As opposed to
norms of [EU] law-which automatically prevail over contrary domestic
legislation in such a way that any court must leave the conflicting domestic
norm disapplied, conflicts between ECHR law and domestic legislation may
not be resolved by ordinary Courts directly but must be referred to the Corte
Costituzionale.
Philipp Cede, Report on Austria and Germany, in THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT
OF THE ECHR AND EU LAWS 55 (Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2010)

(comparing the approaches followed by the Constitutional Courts in Austria and
Germany).
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primary side-effects:
a significant increase in the docket of a
constitutional court, most likely affecting its ability to provide timely
justice for claims falling within the Court's jurisdiction (as happened in
Spain before the 2007 reform); as well as a possible delegitimation of
ordinary judges, especially when the ICC system allows applications
against decisions of ordinary and administrative courts.
The Italian system of judicial review has shown, over the years, the
ability to re-define itself to address "grey areas" in fundamental-rights
protection through a progressive interpretation of the existing rules on
the incidenter procedure to access the Constitutional Court. If a system
of individual constitutional complaint needs to be adopted, this system
also needs to be carefully designed, in order to structure direct recourse
in a way that would not affect the existing "virtuous nexus" between the
Constitutional Court and ordinary judges, and would not increase the
Court's workload to the point of making its decisions untimely andultimately-ineffective. Also, in light of the very recent development
regarding the infra-constitutional status now accorded to the European
Convention on Human Rights in the Italian system of sources of law, it is
this author's view that adoption of a general and broad system of ICC
would ultimately bring about more disadvantages than advantages.
It is our view that a more narrowly designed system, introducing
very specific and not-generalized cases of direct recourse and granting
access to "enumerated and well-defined individuals or state bodies ...
and/or for enumerated and well-identified violations"-as emphasized by
the Constitutional Court in one of its decisions-seems to be more
compatible with the current status of the Italian system of judicial
review. 2 32 On this point, we share a leading Italian legal scholar's view
that a system of judicial review operating more broadly but less timely
(due to the overburdening of the Court) would be less beneficial than one
operating promptly but on a narrower scale.233

232. The issue was indeed addressed by the Constitutional Court in an obiter dicta in
decision no. 406 of July 14, 1989, par. 3 of the "Conclusions on points of law."
According to the Court, "grey areas" can be addressed by "modifying (through
constitutional amendment) the system of judicial review with the introduction of new
'principaliter' proceedings (actionable by enumerated and well-defined individuals or
state bodies ... and/or for enumerated and well-identified violations)." See Corte cost.
decision no. 406/1989.
233. See Mauro Cappelletti, Intervento [Speech], in LA GIUSTIZIA COSTITUZIONALE
399-400 (Giuseppe Maranini ed., 1966).

